The Polioviruses of Man*

Plotkin, Stanley А.; Carp, Richard I.; Graham, Angus

doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.1962.tb18877.x

Cited by 19 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 157 publications

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“…( 22,23,25,83 ) Studies have reported WPV in throat secretions from as many as 83% of subjects during the first 2–6 days, ( 184 ) but isolation rates are routinely less than half the rates from stools. ( 37,87,163 ) Virus disappears from blood and throat secretions within 7–10 days, coinciding with the appearance of serum antibodies, which have little effect on fecal excretion. ( 17 ) Polioviruses that replicate elsewhere in the human body but not the gut have not been found.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…( 78,170 ) Extraneous organic matter slows inactivation, ( 208 ) and poliovirus resists lipid solvents (ether and chloroform), acids, ( 170 ) and common commercial laboratory disinfectants, including cresols, alcohol, and iodine. ( 212 ) OPV/Sabin strains differ from WPV in optimum growth temperatures, ( 119 ) pH sensitivity, ( 163 ) and the heat stabilizing influence of organic and inorganic acids, ( 213 ) but no evidence suggests that these characteristics offer either advantages or disadvantages for environmental survival.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Containment of Polioviruses After Eradication and OPV Cessation: Characterizing Risks to Improve Management

Dowdle

Avoort²,

Gourville³

et al. 2006

Risk Analysis

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The goal of the World Health Organization is to stop routine use of oral poliovirus vaccine shortly after interruption of wild poliovirus transmission. A key component of this goal is to minimize the risk of reintroduction by destruction of polioviruses except in an absolute minimum number of facilities that serve essential functions and implement effective containment. Effective containment begins with a complete facility risk assessment. This article focuses on characterizing the risks of exposure to polioviruses from the essential vaccine production, quality control, and international reference and research facilities that remain. We consider the potential exposure pathways that might lead to a poliovirus reintroduction, including para-occupational exposures and releases to the environment, and review the literature to provide available estimates and a qualitative assessment of containment risks. Minimizing the risk of poliovirus transmission from a poliovirus facility to increasingly susceptible communities is a crucial and ongoing effort requiring understanding and actively managing the potential exposure pathways.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%