The Political Economy of Alignment: Great Britain's Commitments to Europe, 1905–39

Narizny, Kevin

doi:10.1162/016228803321951135

Cited by 25 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Furthermore, relevant constituents still have clear incentives to place the burden on others even if defense spending contributes to a public good. This is evident in political debates over defense spending in the shadow of significant external threats and expectations of war (Narizny, 2003). Fiscal alternatives to borrowing (spending cuts, new taxes or monetary expansion) also risk macroeconomic stress (Ohanian, 1997) that can further risk a leader's hold on power.…”

Section: Creditworthiness and Military Spendingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Guns, butter, and debt

DiGiuseppe

2015

Journal of Peace Research

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I argue that favorable access to sovereign credit provides governments with greater autonomy to invest in security by allowing political incumbents to relax fixed-budget constraints. Borrowing permits leaders to delay and minimize the macroeconomic and redistributive costs associated with domestic sources of finance. Consequently, leaders of creditworthy states face fewer political costs when increasing military expenditure in response to growing demand or maintaining military expenditure when government revenues fall. A cross-sectional time-series analysis supports two observable implications of the argument. First, creditworthiness is positively associated with military spending with an effect on par with regime type. Second, creditworthiness conditions the effect of external threats on military expenditure, suggesting that poor credit terms constrain the provision of security.

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Section: Creditworthiness and Military Spendingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Guns, butter, and debt

DiGiuseppe

2015

Journal of Peace Research

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“…One version argues that domestic and individual idiosyncrasies will impair the state from increasing extraction or mobilization as necessary, resulting in self-defeating and non-rational foreign and domestic policies (Friedberg, 1988;Snyder, 1991;Rosecrance and Stein, 1993;Kupchan, 1994). A second version maintains that competition among log-rolled coalitions, interest groups, and/or state institutions with opposing preferences will shape a state's economic and military foreign policy (Kehr, 1977;Gaddis, 1982;Friedberg, 1988;Milner, 1988Milner, , 1997Simmons, 1994;Lawson, 1996;Narizny, 2003).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of War Mobilization: From Britain's Limited Liability to a Continental Commitment

Lobell

2006

Int Polit

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How does war affect the structure of domestic interests in democratic capitalist states and how are these interests reflected in the conduct of the war? Developing a second image reversed 'plus' argument (outside-in and then inside-out), I contend that war can alter the domestic balance of political power, and can thereby affect the orientation of a state's security strategy. Wars that induce the extraction of wealth and the mobilization of resources will empower a coalition of domestic actors and interest groups who will lobby the government for an offensive security policy, including greater defense spending, military and industrial conscription, state planning and intervention in the economy, and protectionism. I apply this model to Britain and use a research design based on a longitudinal-controlled comparison over the periods of 1912-1914 and 1914-1916 to examine why Britain escalated its involvement in World War I from Limited Liability prior to the outbreak of the war and during the initial years of the war to a Continental Commitment by April of 1916.

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“…Fordham (1998) andNarizny (2003b), among others, have addressed some of Snyder's shortcomings. Also seeSolingen (1998),Trubowitz (1998), andRowe (1999).at University of New England on June 12, 2015 cmp.sagepub.com Downloaded from…”

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confidence: 99%

Politics and National Security: The Battles for Britain

Lobell

2004

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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Between 1889 and 1939 Britain created security for itself through alliances, rearmament, or appeasement (either alone or in some combination). The existing literature emphasizes the role of geopolitics, domestic characteristics, and individual idiosyncrasies to explain Britain's choices. I argue that within Britain, two broad and logrolled coalitions (outward-looking internationalist bloc and inward-oriented nationalist faction) battled to advance their faction's preferred security strategy and to capture the associated distributive benefits. Supporters and opponents understood that how Britain secured itself would create internal winners and losers. Supporters and opponents also recognized that any changes in the security strategy would have domestic redistributional consequences. I apply this model to Britain and use a longitudinal controlled comparison over three periods

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The Political Economy of Alignment: Great Britain's Commitments to Europe, 1905–39

Cited by 25 publications

References 23 publications

Guns, butter, and debt

Guns, butter, and debt

The Political Economy of War Mobilization: From Britain's Limited Liability to a Continental Commitment

Politics and National Security: The Battles for Britain

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