The Political Economy of Beliefs: Why Fiscal and Social Conservatives/Liberals Come Hand-in-Hand

Chen, Daniel L.; Lind, Jo Thori

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2740542

Cited by 16 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Regarding religiousness, among others, one may intend to test a hypothesis on the importance of church-state separation inspired by Chen and Lind (2007): European countries with low religiosity and low church-state separation tend to have expanded Welfare States.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…34 In addition, we should remind rather vast differences among countries across the world, and in particular, the difference between the USA, where religious people typically demand less government interventions (Republicans), and Europe where voters of Christians parties are usual much less rightoriented especially in case of fiscal and redistributive policies. Chen and Lind (2007) provide a hopeful explanation of this difference. According to them, there are countries which sustain high religiosity, high church-state separation and a reduced Welfare State (e.g.…”

mentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Chen and Lind assert that the separation between state and church is key (2007: 2): "welfare is not competitive against religious groups when government funding can be distributed to religious groups." Based on the concept of external control of reinforcement and Chen and Lind (2007), we may want to test a further hypothesis: "In Europe, with a relatively low level of church-state separation, we expect that religious people demand relatively more welfare state." We shall leave that to a next paper.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Reforming Welfare States

Huber

Leoni

Pitlik

2016

Competitiveness, Social Inclusion and Sustainability in a Diverse European Union

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 93%

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confidence: 99%

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Reforming Welfare States

Huber

Leoni

Pitlik

2016

Competitiveness, Social Inclusion and Sustainability in a Diverse European Union

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“…The concept that individuals' view monetary and psychic benefits as separate is further support by existing research. Typically, what is seen is that even in countries with highly religious populations, individuals on average give no more than two % of their income to the church (Hungerman, 2005;Chen & Lind, 2005;Dehjia et al, 2005). This illustrates a clear psychological disconnect between the individuals perceived financial contribution and their actual contribution.…”

Section: Argument's Basis and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Religiosity and its Impact on Individual Support for Welfare Spending Over Time

Adams

John²

2015

URCEU

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In this paper, I will argue that individual preferences toward religion have a significant relationship with an individual's level of support for welfare spending. Specifically, this research finds that as religiosity increases support for welfare spending decreases. This assessment is reached through Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions using the World Values Survey (WVS). Furthermore it looks to address the potential for a temporal pattern that results from these preferences. The objective of this work is to not only establish the relationship between these two individual preferences but to also illustrate the implication they may have on federal policy toward welfare spending across Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations. Lastly, by engaging in a case between Norway and Sweden, I hope to uncover some national level characteristics that may significantly influence individual preferences. KeywordsReligiosity, Welfare Spending, Individual PreferenceReligiosity and its Impact on Individual Support for Welfare Spen 2 IntroductionOne of the major traits consistently seen throughout the modern post-industrialized world is the existence of government funded social support and welfare programs. These programs are designed to benefit the poor and less fortunate, typically while taxing the wealthiest portions of the population at higher rates. Among the nations that fit the description of a post-industrialized democracy, there exists a great deal of variation in the degree to which these nations choose to fund these programs. This disparity is in addition to the fact that there are also major differences in the individual level of support for welfare programs seen throughout all of these countries. What this variance represents is one of the more interesting questions concerning political economy at the cross-national level. Understanding this variance in individual level support for welfare spending is extremely relevant for modern society.With Portugal spending $4,380 per inhabitant while Germany and Luxembourg spending $9,363 and $17,870 respectively, the potential for social and economic impacts as a result of these programs becomes clear (Eurostat, 2013). This disparity is further exemplified by the welfare spending patterns seen in the United States and France. The U.S. spends 16.3 % of its annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on these programs, while France spends 29.7 % of its annual GDP. This disparity is further highlighted by the significant difference at the individual level of support seen in public opinion polls throughout each of these nations. Countries like Japan, Norway and Greece see over 25 % of the population showing high levels of support for these programs, while nations like Sweden and France are below 10 % (Eurostat, 2013). Ultimately, a great deal of debate exists concerning why some individuals choose to support welfare programs, while others do not. This research seeks to enhance our understanding of the roots of support for welfare programs. I invest...

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“…Twelve U.S. pharmaceutical companies representing 42% of total pharmaceutical industry revenues released data on payments from 2009-2011 totaling to $316 million to 316,622 physicians in 50 states and Washington, D.C. States were classified as having disclosure laws that were strong (3 states-Massachusetts, Vermont, and Minnesota), weak (4 states-West Virginia, District of Columbia, Maine, and California), or non-existent (44 states) based on whether data was reported to state authorities (weak) or was made publicly available (strong). Our analysis of state laws is limited by the lack of true randomization that is present in court-made law (Belloni et al 2012b, Chen and Lind 2014 Chen and Yeh 2014b, Chen and Yeh 2013, Chen and Sethi 2011), so we use two approaches in our analysis of disclosure laws and payments to physicians. First, we use a multiple regression in a cross-sectional framework and assess whether our estimates change significantly with the inclusion of controls that may be correlated with both the laws and the payments.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mandatory Disclosure: Theory and Evidence from Industry-Physician Relationships

et al. 2016

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We present and test a model of mandatory disclosure. The effects of disclosure laws on what is being disclosed are typically unknown since data on disclosed activity rarely exist in the absence of disclosure laws. We exploit data from legal settlements disclosing $316 million in pharmaceutical company payments to 316,622 physicians across the U.S. from 2009-2011. States were classified as having strong, weak, or no disclosure based on whether the data was reported only to state authorities (weak) or were publicly available (strong). Strong disclosure law was associated with reduced payments among doctors accepting less than $100 and increased payments among doctors accepting greater than $100. Weak disclosure states, despite imposing administrative compliance costs to industry, were indistinguishable from no disclosure states. This result suggests that the mechanism for fewer small payments in strong disclosure states was physicians' reduced willingness to accept payments rather than the imposition of significant administrative costs on industry. We conduct additional analysis holding fixed the cost for pharmaceutical companies of disclosing data, which was possible because Massachusetts began releasing payment data online during our sample period. Differences-indifferences analyses and multiple regression yield similar estimates for each payment category: Mandatory disclosure reduced payments for speaking and for meals but increased payments for consulting activities. Significant disclosure aversion reducing conflicts of interest is consistent with the policy goals of mandatory disclosure, though the increased payments among those receiving large payments may have been unintended.

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The Political Economy of Beliefs: Why Fiscal and Social Conservatives/Liberals Come Hand-in-Hand

Cited by 16 publications

References 21 publications

Reforming Welfare States

Reforming Welfare States

Religiosity and its Impact on Individual Support for Welfare Spending Over Time

Mandatory Disclosure: Theory and Evidence from Industry-Physician Relationships

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