The political economy of comparative corporate governance

Abstract

Contemporary research on comparative corporate governance was initially preoccupied with the question of differences in national systems of corporate governance. In recent years, however, the focus has shifted to change as some scholars argue that there are growing pressures on national systems of corporate governance to converge on a model that supports an increased focus on shareholder value, that is, a model that closely resembles the US system of corporate governance. In opposition to this view, others predict that systems of corporate governance around the world will continue to diverge. Drawing on the examples of France and Germany I show that considerable change has indeed occurred in national governance systems. Particularly important has been the growing influence of the stock market. Existing theories are inadequate for understanding the political economy of the changes that have taken place in the French and German systems of corporate governance as well as the likelihood that they will continue to evolve in the direction of shareholder value. To support this claim I focus on a common, and fundamental, deficiency in all of the theoretical approaches to the subject, that is, the weakness in their analysis of the relationship between the changing role of the stock market and the productive capabilities of particular national economies.

Where Are All the Women? Institutional Context and the Prevalence of Women on the Corporate Board of Directors

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Worker Problem-Solving and the Nature of the Firm: New Theory, New Evidence

“…It has also been argued that differentiation within capitalism may be diminishing due to global competitive forces. (Baccaro and Howell, 2012;O'Sullivan, 2003;Yamamura and Streeck, 2003;Katz and Darbishire, 2000) A particular convergence mechanism of interest is that the liberal sector within coordinated economies may be expanding. (Raess, 2014;Palier and Thelen, 2012;Silvia and Schroeder, 2007) This latest wave of skepticism has not yet absorbed developments subsequent to 2008, however.…”

Essays on Corporate Reputation: Antecedents and Consequences

“…Despite the traditional emphasis in the corporate governance literature, recent research has dedicated increasing attention to the ways that other constituencies influence the firm and make claims on its resources (Fiss, 2008;Freeman, Wicks & Parmar, 2004). O'Sullivan (2003), for instance, urges researchers to study more closely how labor power and preferences affect firm behavior. The comparative literature on corporate governance offers important insights on the various influences of the firm's diverse stakeholders (Schneper & Guillén, 2004 on market-based forces to discipline and control managers (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003;Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998;Guillén 2000).…”