The political economy of constitutional federalism

Hamlin, Alan

doi:10.1007/bf00179739

Cited by 9 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 23 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Nothing is said of a likely relationship between collective decision rules and the centralization of policies. This is not surprising considering that the standard literature assumes that government-central or other-is a benevolent social welfare maximizer (Hamlin 1985). 5 More recently, the political (dis)integration literature returns to the trade-off and concludes, unsurprisingly, that lower levels of government should provide functions and goods for which economies of scale and scope are less important and heterogeneity of preference is higher while higher level jurisdictions should be assigned policy areas where economies of scale and scope are high and so too is homogeneity of preferences (for a survey see Ruta 2005).…”

Section: Theoretical Priorsmentioning

confidence: 71%

Decision rules, membership and political centralization in the European Union

Kyriacou

2008

Eur J Law Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Section: Theoretical Priorsmentioning

confidence: 71%

Decision rules, membership and political centralization in the European Union

Kyriacou

2008

Eur J Law Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Thus, one could begin with a particular constitutional arrangement familiar from the real world and enquire, by application of the logic outlined above, as to the range of values which might support such a constitution. A preliminary analysis of this type (Hamlin, 1981) applied to the choice of explicitly federalist constitutions is presented elsewhere.…”

Section: Concluding Commentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Constitutional control of processes and their outcomes

Hamlin

1984

Public Choice

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper explores the distinction between processes of decision making and their outcomes in the context of the individualistic constitutional calculus. The motivation is primarily methodological. A taxonomy and analytic framework are suggested which explicitly recognize the possible motivations of the constitution setter, and which allow decision making processes to be viewed as both means and ends. The framework is utilized to provide a critical review of some aspects of the received literature.

show abstract

“…This model posits that because the population of taxpayers/services' consumers is mobile between jurisdictions, governments are constrained by competition with other jurisdictions to retain taxpayers/consumers (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980;Brennan, 1981;Hamlin, 1985). This has obvious explanatory power for a multistate federation like the USA.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

A continuing confusion? A comment on the appropriate dispersal of policy powers in the Australian federation

Genitsen

1990

Australian Journal of Political Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Dissatisfaction with Australia's federalist constitutional and administrative arrangements seems universal. The Labor Party has historically preferred a centralist thrust to the Australian federal compact. From the opposite, decentralist tack the Liberal-National Coalition parties currently propose that the Commonwealth should hive-off policy functions to the States. These attitudes are expressed in an intellectual climate that disparages the allocative efficiency of Australian federalism and debates these issues in terms of shifting power to or from the Commonwealth. A more sensible focus is on the usage that the citizenry has made of the federal system in obtaining satisfactory service delivery. Using this approach our federal system works efficiently (in a limited politicaladministrative sense. This is not an argument that Australia's federal system is good because it maximises fiscal efficiency or guarantees equity. It does not do the former'and varies in its attainment of the latter. The federal system is good because it maximises opportunities and avenues for citizens to obtain what they want from government. In that sense the Coalition parties are fundamentally confused both about their philosophy and that philosophy's relationship to the political nature of Australian federalism. Labor's slowly-ebbing centralism equally ignores the political usage that citizens have made of the administrative and funding arenas provided by our federal system.

show abstract

The political economy of constitutional federalism

Cited by 9 publications

References 23 publications

Decision rules, membership and political centralization in the European Union

Decision rules, membership and political centralization in the European Union

Constitutional control of processes and their outcomes

A continuing confusion? A comment on the appropriate dispersal of policy powers in the Australian federation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About