The political economy of cultural spending: evidence from Italian cities

Nogare, Chiara Dalle; Galizzi, Matteo M.

doi:10.1007/s10824-011-9145-3

Cited by 35 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…12 Dalle Nogare and Galizzi (2011) find no evidence of a left-right divide in the cultural spending of local Italian governments. This rules out the possibility of an over-representation of museums in municipalities with a center-left or left government in our sample.…”

Section: Data and Empirical Strategymentioning

confidence: 93%

Immigrants, voter sentiment, and local public goods: The case of museums

Nogare

Scuderi

Bertacchini

2021

Journal of Regional Science

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Section: Data and Empirical Strategymentioning

confidence: 93%

Immigrants, voter sentiment, and local public goods: The case of museums

Nogare

Scuderi

Bertacchini

2021

Journal of Regional Science

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“…Benito et al, 2013). However, politico-economic variables, such as the ideology of the ruling party, and the relation between majority and minority parties, might not be as relevant as on the national or provincial level (in regard to municipal cultural spending in Italy, see Dalle Nogare & Galizzi, 2011;cf. Potrafke, 2011).…”

Section: The Determinants Of Municipal Cultural Spending: a Brief Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Socio-economic and spatial determinants of municipal cultural spending

Getzner

2021

J Cult Econ

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The determinants of the expenditure of Austrian municipalities for cultural affairs are ascertained in a panel time series framework. The Austrian municipalities spend about € 93 per capita a year for cultural affairs (approximately 4% of the total municipal expenditure). The econometric estimations revealed that the size of the municipality, and various socio-economic, fiscal and political variables, are the main determinants of municipal cultural spending. The results of the estimations infer a rather small but nevertheless significant spatial dependence of cultural spending. An increase of 10% of cultural spending in the neighboring regions leads to an increase of 0.6–1.5% in a representative municipality (however, the potentially overlapping and contradicting reasons for spatial correlations could not be disentangled in this paper). In comparison to the spatial effects, the size of the municipality is a more significant predictor of municipal cultural spending. The larger cities provide many cultural goods and services to the surrounding areas by utilizing economies of scale and density. It can be concluded that municipalities, in particular in rural areas, should increase their efforts for co-operation in order to improve the efficiency of cultural spending.

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“…It is possible for voters to successfully respond to the principal-agent problem: a documented case is voting on the EU I consider the principal-agent problem in the context of public spending on cultural facilities. Evidence on the nexus between political ideology and spending on culture is not clear-cut (Schulze and Rose 1998;Getzner 2002;Werck et al 2008;Dalle Nogare and Galizzi 2011;Potrafke 2011aPotrafke , 2011bDe Witte and Geys 2011;Benito et al 2013;Noonan 2007;Lewis and Rushton 2007). 2 Rightwing voters might however be expected to support public spending on traditional cultural events such as concerts, theatres, operas and art exhibitions more so than leftwing voters (see Schulze and Ursprung 2000).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evidence on the political principal-agent problem from voting on public finance for concert halls

Potrafke

2013

Const Polit Econ

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Principal-agent problems can arise when preferences of voters are not aligned with preferences of political representatives. Often the consequence of the political principal-agent problem is political catering to special interests. In this paper I provide examples of principalagent problems regarding public spending. The examples concern construction or extension of concert halls in two German cities. Resistance to public funding for the concert halls was particularly strong in electoral districts with large constituencies on the left. The evidence indicates that political representatives were more bourgeois than their constituencies. In the cases studied asymmetric information did not prevail and voters were able to discipline their representatives through referenda that countered the results of voting by political representatives. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: D720, D780, H720, Z100.

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The political economy of cultural spending: evidence from Italian cities

Abstract: Public cultural expenditure, Political economy, Local government, H44, H76, Z11,

Cited by 35 publications

References 32 publications

Immigrants, voter sentiment, and local public goods: The case of museums

Immigrants, voter sentiment, and local public goods: The case of museums

Socio-economic and spatial determinants of municipal cultural spending

Evidence on the political principal-agent problem from voting on public finance for concert halls

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