The Political Economy of Equalization Transfers

Khemani, Stuti

doi:10.1007/978-0-387-48988-9_19

Cited by 15 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 31 publications

(24 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…They influence the flow of federal funds and the financing of village councils and they are responsible, inter alia, for roads, electricity, law and order, health, and education. Political manipulation by state governments can influence the allocation of federal transfers (Khemani 2006) and of federally funded development programmes (Gupta and Mukhopadhyay 2014). Legislators can influence economic conditions in their constituencies by, for instance, improving the supply of public services like electricity (Baskaran et al 2015;Min 2015), attracting 'pork' by lobbying the state government, exerting efforts to pursue development opportunities, and implementing federal or state government programmes more or less effectively.…”

Section: Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Women legislators and economic performance

Baskaran¹,

Bhalotra²,

Min³

et al. 2018

WIDER Working Paper

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

provides economic analysis and policy advice with the aim of promoting sustainable and equitable development. The Institute began operations in 1985 in Helsinki, Finland, as the first research and training centre of the United Nations University. Today it is a unique blend of think tank, research institute, and UN agency-providing a range of services from policy advice to governments as well as freely available original research. The Institute is funded through income from an endowment fund with additional contributions to its work programme from Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom as well as earmarked contributions for specific projects from a variety of donors.

show abstract

Section: Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Women legislators and economic performance

Baskaran¹,

Bhalotra²,

Min³

et al. 2018

WIDER Working Paper

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In order to do justice to different circumstances, a fine-tuned allocation model tends to be used. Recent research confirms that independent agencies are less prone to political influence than ministries (Khemani, 2004). 21 …”

mentioning

confidence: 66%

Fiscal Equalisation in OECD Countries

Blöchliger

Merk

Charbit

et al. 2007

OECD Working Papers on Fiscal Federalism

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…(There is also a large quantity of literature on the political economy of intergovernmental transfers. However, political economy models are out of the scope of this paper, but the interested reader might consult Khemani (2007) and Borck and Owings (2003)). More recent literature on fiscal federalism has also emphasized that the design of fiscal policy should recognize that the resources allocated for public spending should correspond with the preferences of residents in each locality (see Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007); Boadway (2007) and Hankla et al (2019)).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regional Heterogeneity of Preferences and Intergovernmental Transfers

Rodríguez

2021

Economies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We develop a model with optimal shares of intergovernmental transfers, and we apply a simulation analysis of our model for the case of Mexico. The main outcomes of this paper are as follows: First, we provide optimal shares of intergovernmental funds to be allocated in each state considering the regional distribution of the benefits of local public spending in Mexico. Second, our analysis shows that the regional heterogeneity of preferences across regions should be an important determinant of federal funds allocated to state governments. Third, the current system of finance relies on a tax revenue sharing accord that emphasizes nationwide tax collection issues as the main determinants of intergovernmental transfers and local spending. Our analysis provides a contrast between how fiscal policy is conducted, and feasible choices of policy reform. Fourth, our analysis of simulation identifies winners and losers from policy reform, and so our analysis contributes to a better understanding of the advantages and shortcomings of the current policy of intergovernmental transfers, providing feasible ways to improve the outcomes of subnational government spending.

show abstract

The Political Economy of Equalization Transfers

Cited by 15 publications

References 31 publications

Women legislators and economic performance

Women legislators and economic performance

Fiscal Equalisation in OECD Countries

Regional Heterogeneity of Preferences and Intergovernmental Transfers

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About