The Political Economy of Governance Reforms in Uganda

Abstract

About IDSThe Institute of Development Studies is one of the world's leading organisations for research, teaching and communications on international development. Founded in 1966, the Institute enjoys an international reputation based on the quality of its work and the rigour with which it applies academic skills to real world challenges. Its purpose is to understand and explain the world, and to try to change it -to influence as well as to inform.IDS hosts five dynamic research programmes, five popular postgraduate courses, and a family of worldclass web-based knowledge services. These three spheres are integrated in a unique combination -as a development knowledge hub, IDS is connected into and is a convenor of networks throughout the world.The Institute is home to approximately 80 researchers, 50 knowledge services staff, 50 support staff and about 150 students at any one time. But the IDS community extends far beyond, encompassing an extensive network of partners, former staff and students across the development community worldwide. IDS DISCUSSION PAPER 386The Political Economy of Governance Reforms in Uganda This publication is copyright, but may be reproduced by any method without fee for teaching or non-profit purposes, but not for resale. Formal permission is required for all such uses, but normally will be granted immediately. For copying in any other circumstances, or for re-use in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, prior written permission must be obtained from the publisher, and a fee may be payable. AbstractThis paper presents three cases of successful governance reforms in Uganda, highlighting the political and institutional factors that explain the different trajectories of implementation, as well as features they share in common. Despite variations in content and focus, the governance reforms examined here were designed to promote structural changes in state institutions and change the incentives that shape the behaviour of state actors.The three cases of governance reform -civil service reform, the creation of a semiautonomous revenue authority and anti-corruption agencies -share a number of common features. First, they all followed a similar trajectory in their implementation, achieving a degree of initial success that was then gradually undermined. Second, the institutional features that appear to account for that initial success -strong political support to technocratic or bureaucratic elites with some degree of insulation from political and societal interestsalso help explain why such reforms are susceptible to a process of unravelling. Third, the main explanation for the loss of reform momentum (or even reversal of gains made) lies in the imperative of preserving the institutional foundations of neo-patrimonial politics.All three governance reforms considered here achieved a degree of initial success: civil service reform succeeded in downsizing and rationalising the bureaucracy; the revenue authority achieved increased tax revenues; and anti-corruption efforts led to th...

Globalisation, accounting and developing countries

“…Local politicians may lack commitment to accounting reforms that erode their power to siphon public funds from government treasuries and extract economic rents within a façade of rules (Cammack, 2007). For example, anti-corruption initiatives in Uganda threatening the regime's patronage-based support lacked political commitment (Robinson, 2006). The failure of IFMS in Ghana was attributed to politicians believing that it was a technical matter foisted on them, but their support waned when they realised the political implications of greater transparency and accountability (Wynne, 2005).…”

Autonomy or organisation? Reforms in the Ghanaian internal revenue service

“…Moreover, tax collection is emphasised at the expense of other broad-based reforms of tax administration, such as systems of financial management. Finally, in the absence of accountability mechanisms, ARAs can become a 'super entity' that can abuse their taxation powers (Robinson, 2006). The question then is whether the benefits of increased autonomy outweigh the costs (Taliercio, 2003a;Mann, 2004;Kidd and Crandall, 2006).…”

Investigating the Links between Political Settlements and Inclusive Development in Uganda: Towards a Research Agenda.

“…The URA was once heralded as one of Uganda's few pockets of bureaucratic excellence, shielded from overt political influence and the beneficiary of large-scale donor funding (Robinson, 2006). This reputation had diminished by the early 2000s, and while some observers have suggested that the current leadership has largely turned things around again, Uganda's IGG 2008 National Integrity Survey showed that 77 per cent of households rated the URA as corrupt.…”