The political economy of international factor mobility

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The combination of increasing immigration pressures and restrictive policies imperfectly enforced by many destination countries has made illegal immigration widespread. This paper provides an overview of the mechanisms behind the formation of migration policies and how they lead to or they limit the presence of illegal immigrants. We also study how governments deal ex-post with the presence of undocumented foreign workers by introducing immigration amnesties. We review the determinants of their introduction and address their desirability from the point of view of aggregate welfare. As countries in the EU differ substantially in the implementation of both ex-ante and ex-post immigration policies, we emphasize the need for more coordination in the area of migration policy enforcement, both at the border and within each country.

Section: A Lobbying Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Lobbying Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Illegal Immigration: Policy Perspectives and Challenges

Casarico¹,

Facchini²,

Frattini³

2015

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“…The paper that is most closely related to our analysis is Facchini and Willmann (2005). Using the menu auction framework pioneered by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), the authors model the determination of policies towards international factor mobility as the result of the interaction between organized groups and an elected politician.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Lobbying Expenditures on Migration: a Descriptive Analysis

Facchini¹,

Mayda²,

Mishra³

2015

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In this paper we carry out a descriptive analysis of lobbying expenditures on migration in the US between 1998 and 2005. While PAC contributions and lobbying are in general positively correlated, our results suggest that this is not the case when it comes to lobbying on migration. As a result, any analysis of the role of lobbying in migration should not focus on PAC contributions alone. Comparing lobbying on migration and trade, we find that substantially more resources are spent on the latter than on the former.Finally, lobbying on migration appears to be more concentrated than lobbying on trade both across sectors and across organizations. 1 We thank for useful comments seminar participants at the CESifo workshop on "Migration Policies" in Munich. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy.

“…Benhabib 1996, Ortega 2005, Facchini and Willmann 2005and Facchini and Testa 2014. It is also related to the body of works that have considered the effectiveness of different migration policy instruments from the point of view of the maximization of the destination country's aggregate welfare (e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Migration Enforcement: Domestic Versus Border Control

Facchini¹,

Testa²

2015

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We study migration policy enforcement by an elected government. The policy-maker faces uncertainty on the supply of migrants, but has more information than the public on its preferences and the extent and effectiveness of its enforcement activities. We show that a utilitarian government preferring more migrants than the majority may find it optimal to set a restrictive target to please the median voter, while relaxing its enforcement to admit more foreigners in a concealed way. Lax enforcement may be achieved either by deploying inadequate resources on cost-effective activities (domestic enforcement) or by allocating a larger budget on less effective tools (border enforcement). The attractiveness of one instrument over the other depends on the size of the immigrant flow: if the supply is large, border enforcement might be preferred because, although more costly, it brings the number of migrants closer to the utilitarian optimum. Hence, re-election concerns might provide a rationale for the widespread use of less a effective enforcement tool, such as border control.JEL classification: F22, J61.