2019
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3484765
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The Political Economy of Multilateral Lending to European Regions

Abstract: We study the political economy of allocation decisions within a major state investment bank. Our focus is the European Investment Bank (EIB)-"The Bank of the EU"-which is the largest multilateral lending (and borrowing) institution in the world. We collect (and make available) information on the regions of origin of about 500 national representatives at the EIB's Board of Directors-the decisive body for loan approvals-since its foundation in 1959 and show that a representative's appointment increases the proba… Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 44 publications
(57 reference statements)
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“…During periods of democracy, favoritism appears to be enacted by less visible strategies, for example educational transfers. Similar evidence on the importance of regional favoritism is available for countries as varied as Germany (Baskaran and Fonseca, 2020), Vietnam (Do, 2017), Italy (Carozzi and Repetto, 2016) or across the regions of Europe (Asatryan and Havlik, 2020). On the other hand, Bandyopadhyay and Green (2019) find that connected leaders provide poorer quality roads to their home regions.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 78%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…During periods of democracy, favoritism appears to be enacted by less visible strategies, for example educational transfers. Similar evidence on the importance of regional favoritism is available for countries as varied as Germany (Baskaran and Fonseca, 2020), Vietnam (Do, 2017), Italy (Carozzi and Repetto, 2016) or across the regions of Europe (Asatryan and Havlik, 2020). On the other hand, Bandyopadhyay and Green (2019) find that connected leaders provide poorer quality roads to their home regions.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 78%
“…Political leaders regularly use public resources to favor some regions within their countries over others. Indeed, regional favoritism appears to be a global phenomenon, observable in one form or another in contexts as varied as Europe (Baskaran and Fonseca, 2020;Asatryan and Havlik, 2020), Asia (Do et al, 2016;Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999), or Africa (Burgess et al, 2015). One question that remains largely unexplored, however, is how favored regions make use of any additional resources obtained due to their connection to powerful politicians.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The contributions in this special issue add to broaden and deepen the state of the art in political economy research on the EU in several ways. First, two of the articles (Erce et al 2020;Asatryan and Havlik 2020) study EU institutions that aredespite their economic importancerarely in the focus of academic research. The fact that the ESM will play a decisive role in the current Covid-19 crisis only underscores the importance of studying this institution in more detail.…”
Section: A Research Agendamentioning
confidence: 99%