The political economy of naturalization

Abstract

This paper presents a political economy model in which self‐interested natives decide when citizenship and/or voting rights should be granted to foreign‐born workers. Native voters know that immigrants hold different ‘political’ preferences and would thus tend to postpone their enfranchisement as much as possible. They also consider, however, that a more restrictive naturalization policy may reduce the gains from immigration. We find that the optimal timing of naturalization depends on the quantity, quality (productivity), and preferences of potential immigrants, the political composition and the age structure of the native population, as well as the sensitivity of migration choices to the citizenship issue.

Immigration and Redistribution

“…Just as immigration restrictions, these naturalization laws emerge from a political process, whereby voters decide based on their preferences. Models by Mayr (2007) and Mariani (2013) illuminate the trade-offs for voters when deciding on naturalization laws. They show that if the current median voter favours high taxes but expects that immigrants tilt the majority in favour of low taxes, it is best for current voters to restrict immigrant voting rights.…”

Electoral cycles, partisan effects and US naturalization policies

“…4 For detailed figures see Gonzalez-Barrera et al (2013) and Section 2.2. 5 For an overview of naturalization policies, see Mariani (2013). A detailed account of Hispanic immigrants in the U.S. context is provided by DeSipio (2013).…”

“…The literature so far has mainly applied the median voter framework to explain immigration policies, under which the current voters weigh the economic benefits of migrants against their (future) political influence (e.g., Dolmas and Huffmann 2004;Ortega 2005). The same framework is used by Mariani (2013) to explain the optimal timing of naturalization. Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010) find evidence that countries with a jus soli regime tend to implement more restrictive naturalization policies when facing increasing immigration -compared to countries with a jus sanguinis regime.…”

“…Economic incentives are less of a concern as the impact of naturalization on labor market outcomes is very limited for new citizens who have already been permanent residents for a number of years. For a discussion, see, e.g.,Mariani (2013).…”

Endogenous timing in the presence of non‐monotonicities

“…In a general framework, van Damme and Hurkens () analyze ETG when commitment is imperfectly observable. Moreover, there are applications to quota games (Syropoulos and Raimondos‐M⊘ller and Woodland ), spatial duopolies (Lambertini ), charity donations (Romano and Yildrim ), conflict (Siqueira and Sandler ), tax competition (Kempf and Rota‐Graziosi and Eichner ), contests (Hoffmann and Rota‐Graziosi ) and political economy (Mariani ).…”