The Natural Resources Trap 2010
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262013796.003.0020
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The Political Economy of Oil Contract Renegotiation in Venezuela

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Cited by 22 publications
(24 citation statements)
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“…Other technological considerations are the prevalence of sunk costs in resources, combined with mineral price volatility (Nellor 1987;Manzano and Monaldi 2010;Engel and Fischer 2010), and varying uncertainty over project returns at various phases of investment (Kobrin 1980). Mineral extraction typically requires large outlays for exploration and excavation infrastructure before any revenues are realized.…”
Section: Sectoral Patternsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Other technological considerations are the prevalence of sunk costs in resources, combined with mineral price volatility (Nellor 1987;Manzano and Monaldi 2010;Engel and Fischer 2010), and varying uncertainty over project returns at various phases of investment (Kobrin 1980). Mineral extraction typically requires large outlays for exploration and excavation infrastructure before any revenues are realized.…”
Section: Sectoral Patternsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…33 I also present total capital expenditure records of the world petroleum industry. 34 During the late 1950s and 1960s, capital expenditures in the world petroleum industry were stable with the exception of Venezuela in the late 1950s ( Figure 5, left panel). From 1958 to 1961, capital expenses were stable in the rest of the world, but declined by more than 70% in Venezuela and then remained stable until 1975.…”
Section: Key Patterns In the Oil Industrymentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Leaving aside corruption in awarding contracts in the oil industry, other authors (Manzano and Monaldi, ) have focused on how the volatility of rents makes for particular difficulties in affixing a durable set of institutional arrangements for their capture by governments over the longer term. Therefore, governments have ‘powerful incentives for contract renegotiation or nationalization’ (Manzano and Monaldi, , p.411). In relation to this, others (e.g., Stevens, , p. 15) have examined how governments in the 1970s, tired of protracted negotiations with IOCs, established NOCs, thereby ‘cutting out the middle man’ in acquiring rents.…”
Section: Driving Resource Nationalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Leaving aside corruption in awarding contracts in the oil industry, other authors (Manzano and Monaldi, 2010) have focused on how the volatility of rents makes for particular difficulties in affixing a durable set of institutional arrangements for their capture by governments over the longer term. Therefore, governments have 'powerful incentives for contract renegotiation or nationalization' (Manzano and Monaldi, 2010, p.411).…”
Section: Driving Resource Nationalismmentioning
confidence: 99%