The political economy of sugar legislation

Harper, Richard K.; Aldrich, John H.

doi:10.1007/bf00156237

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Tosini and Tower (1987) found that the proportion of textile and apparel workers in the workforce of a congressional district or state was the most significant determinant of the pattern of voting on the 1985 textile bill. Baldwin (1985) presents other evidence of the importance of voting in the determination of U.S. trade policy, and Harper and Aldrich (1991) provide similar evidence on legislation affecting the sugar industry.…”

Section: ϫ␣mentioning

confidence: 94%

Inefficient Redistribution

2001

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T here are many well-developed theories that explain why governments redistribute income, but very few can explain why this often is done in a socially inefficient form. In the theory we develop, compared to efficient methods, inefficient redistribution makes it more attractive to stay in or enter a group that receives subsidies. When political institutions cannot credibly commit to future policy, and when the political influence of a group depends on its size, inefficient redistribution is a tool to sustain political power. Our model may account for the choice of inefficient redistributive policies in agriculture, trade, and the labor market. It also implies that when factors of production are less specific to a sector, inefficient redistribution may be more prevalent.

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Section: ϫ␣mentioning

confidence: 94%

Inefficient Redistribution

2001

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“…For example, Gokcekus, Knowles, and Tower (2004) show how the sugar industry systematically contributes to senators based on their power and willingness to protect sugar. Harper and Aldrich (1991) find that senators vote for sugar subsidies if they receive large contributions from sugar producers. Stratmann (1995) studies the timing of campaign contributions to determine whether they are meant for the purposes of influencing a specific bill or for reelection.…”

Section: Special Interest and Protectionist Policiesmentioning

confidence: 97%

The Cotton Influence Index: An Examination of U.S. Cotton Subsidies

Gökçekuş

Fishler

2009

American J Agri Economics

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Given the lack of a bill or amendment specific to cotton, we introduce a Cotton Influence Index to capture legislators' influence in championing the cause of the cotton growers during the hearings of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002. Regression analyses reveal a relationship between Cotton Influence Index and campaign contributions, cotton farmland, party affiliation, and ideology. Tobit analysis indicates a significant relationship between different "actions and participations" by representatives to advance the interest of cotton-that is, components of this index and their future cotton political action committees' (PACs) contributions to them.

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'Steeling' House Votes at Low Prices for the Steel Import Quota Bill of 1999

Fisher¹,

Gökçekuş

Tower

Contributions to Economic Analysis

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The political economy of sugar legislation

Cited by 4 publications

References 10 publications

Inefficient Redistribution

Inefficient Redistribution

The Cotton Influence Index: An Examination of U.S. Cotton Subsidies

'Steeling' House Votes at Low Prices for the Steel Import Quota Bill of 1999

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