The Political Economy of the Neoliberal Transformation of French Industrial Relations

Abstract

The author advances the literature on the role of the state in the decentralization of industrial relations in France by providing a political economic analysis of Right- and Left-backed governments in recent decades. While both have pursued reforms to reduce regulation and to increase labor market flexibility, they have used the state apparatus in different ways to achieve these goals. The Right has reformed labor law by obtaining partial support from employers’ associations and unions—the social partners. The Left, by contrast, has relied on decentralized bargaining with the social partners because its political base would not have accepted flexibility-increasing legal reforms. The author examines critical episodes of reform in collective bargaining, unemployment insurance, and employment protection laws to show how the state has intervened in different ways depending on the political identity of the governing coalition.

After the social crisis: the transformation of employment relations at France Télécom

“…State-led decentralization of collective bargaining has sought to encourage expanded social dialogue at company and workplace level (Béthoux and Mias, 2019). However, the practical impact of these social dialogue institutions on management practice has been uneven, due to French unions' weak formal bargaining rights, low membership density, and internal ideological divisions (Amable, 2016).…”

Institutional complementarities in the dynamic comparative analysis of capitalism

“…However, the CPE was never implemented given major street demonstrations, whereas the CNE was suppressed only a few months after being implemented. See Amable (2015).…”

The extension of collective agreements in France, Portugal and Spain

“…Centre-right governments have been influenced by employer pressure for greater flexibility. Left-of-centre governments have traditionally favoured decentralisation as a means of increasing local democracy and mutually beneficial agreements (Amable, 2016).…”