The political functions of expert knowledge: knowledge and legitimation in European Union immigration policy

Abstract

Most literature on knowledge utilization is premised on rationalist theories of organizations: bureaucracies draw on knowledge instrumentally, either to expand their power or to adjust policy output. This paper develops an alternative account of the functions of knowledge, arguing that organizations are just as likely to value knowledge as a source of legitimation, or as a way of substantiating their policy preferences. The prevalence of these different forms of knowledge utilization will depend on (a) features of the organization (its perceived stability and source of legitimation); and (b) features of the policy area (degree of contention and mode of settlement). The article applies this framework to explore the European Commission's use of knowledge in immigration policy, especially through the European Migration Network.

(Low) Expectations, Legitimization, and the Contingent Uses of Scientific Knowledge: Engagements with Neuroscience in Scottish Social Policy and Services

“…In other words, they often draw on an empiricist discourse whilst also sometimes adopting (and indeed interweaving) a more contingent repertoire. The empiricist-style discourse-which comes, perhaps paradoxically, to be positioned within a regime of hope (Moreira and Palladino 2005)-serves important instrumental and symbolic functions (Boswell 2008). While the contingent, reflexive aspect of the respondents' talk could relate in part to the relatively private nature of the sociological interview (Fitzgerald 2014), we argue that our data imply that contingent repertoires can also play an important and explicit public role in, for example, engaging with service users.…”

“…This then suggests (in Boswell's idiom) that neuroscience can be used both for overtly instrumental reasons and for more symbolic purposes (i.e., when it is aimed at legitimizing or substantiating policies) (Boswell 2008). One corollary of this, we suggest, is a need to be cautious in any claims-making around the extent to and manner with which neuroscience "determines" policy.…”

“…In this first section, we show how the neurosciences were seen to be used as a means to substantiate policies, especially in terms of granting these "epistemic authority" (Boswell 2008) and, hence, for securing funding for (proposed) services. In particular, our interviewees considered that neuroscientific concepts and findings could provide further (and compelling) justification for changes that they felt ought to be made anyway-policy changes aimed at impacting, for example, inequalities, parenting styles, and (un)healthy lifestyles.…”

“…Boswell (2008), for example, argues how knowledge utilization in politics can have an overtly instrumental function to adjust policies, as well as serving a symbolic function. This latter role includes the substantiation of policy preferences, and the legitimization of (the work of) organizations by "endow [ing] [them] with 'epistemic authority'" (p. 472).…”

Rationalism and public policy: Mode of analysis or symbolic politics?

“…As often argued in the literature, the legitimacy of independent agencies depends on their expertise and the robustness of the technical or scientific rationale underlying their decision processes (Schrefler, 2010). By being seen to draw on the rational/synoptic model, an organization can enhance its legitimacy and authority (Boswell, 2008). To develop this idea, and to provide some suggestive illustrations in its support, the paper draws on the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) on institutional isomorphism as a source of legitimacy and relies on empirical material derived from comparative studies looking at the evolution of "supreme audit institutions" (SAIs).…”