The Political Import of Intrinsic Objections to Genetically Engineered Food

Abstract

Many people object to genetically engineered (GE) food because they believe that it is unnatural or that its creation amounts to playing God. These objections are often referred to as intrinsic objections, and they have been widely criticized in the agricultural bioethics literature as being unsound, incompatible with modern science, religious, inchoate, and based on emotion instead of reason. Many of their critics also argue that even if these objections did have some merit as ethical objections, their quasi-religious nature means that they are entirely irrelevant when interpreted as political objections regarding what public policy ought to be. In this paper, we argue that this widespread view is false. Intrinsic objections have much more political import than has previously been recognized, and indeed the requirements of political liberalism and its associated idea of liberal neutrality, once properly understood, protect intrinsic objections from many of the most common objections. That is, policy-makers may not legitimately base public policy on grounds that are inconsistent with intrinsic objections, even when they believe those objections to be flawed in the ways mentioned above. This means that in the context of a political debate about GE food, the discussion should not center on the substantive merits of the intrinsic objections themselves but rather on the appropriate political norms for achieving democratically legitimate policy on issues that touch people's deepest religious and moral beliefs.

State Neutrality and the Ethics of Human Enhancement Technologies

“…This does not mean they must also endorse a conception of the good by which no religious symbols are displayed on state buildings. Instead, the justification for the policy adoption might be economic in While debates about neutralism and its content are still standard fare amongst political philosophers (see, for example, (Sher 1997;Klosko and Wall 2003;Arneson 2003;Arneson 2008)) there is a general agreement among neutralists that the doctrine includes a constraint on which justifications for public policy are legitimate (see, for example, (Brighouse 1995;Klosko and Wall 2003;Streiffer and Rubel 2004;Streiffer and Hedemann 2005;Marneffe 2008;Macedo 2008)). This commitment to neutrality of justification takes many forms:…”

Consumer Autonomy and Availability of Genetically Modified Food

“…important ways from many other purchasing desires. Desires to buy or not to buy GMF are often based on consumers' values about fundamental issues such as health, nature, and social justice (Streiffer and Hedeman 2005;Comstock 2001;Marris et al 2001). Not all purchasing desires are similarly based on consumers' fundamental values.…”

Ethics in the Societal Debate on Genetically Modified Organisms: A (Re)Quest for Sense and Sensibility

“…This narrowed ''ethics'' to the private/ individual sphere. Also, intrinsic moral concerns of people perceiving GM agro-food products as ''unnatural,'' as ''a violation of the sanctity of species,'' as ''disrespectful for nature'' or as ''incompatible with organic farming'' remain unaddressed in decision-making (Brom, 2000;Streiffer and Hedemann, 2005;Streiffer and Rubel, 2004). When people reject GM food, they are expressing ''unease at the prevalent direction of the agro-food system, which remains beyond democratic control; they can see no political means to influence decisions'' (Levidow and Marris, 2001: 352).…”