The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force

Voeten, Erik

doi:10.1017/s0020818305050198

Cited by 213 publications

(115 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…First, states interact within IOs repeatedly, and this allows states to demonstrate their cooperative intentions. Great powers, in particular, can use IOs to tie their hands in order to signal their intentions (Ikenberry 2001;Voeten 2005). Repeated interactions also foster expectations of reciprocity and reduce cheating by detecting non-cooperative behavior and providing information about states' compliance (Weber 1997;Abbott and Snidal 1998;Moravcsik 1999;2000;Fortna 2003).…”

Section: Hypothesis M5: Trade Links Decrease Uncertainty In Interstatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Uncertainty in International Crises

Bas¹,

McLean

Whang³

2017

kjis

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This study focuses on sources of uncertainty in two substantive areas of international security: militarized disputes and economic sanctions. We revisit realist and liberal debates as two long-standing paradigmatic approaches that address the role of uncertainty, and draw on their insights to identify key variables that represent sources of uncertainty. We evaluate these variables' effects on uncertainty using a heteroskedastic probit model and data on disputes and sanctions. We find that measures of power parity, system multipolarity, joint democracy and trade are significantly linked to levels of uncertainty for disputes and military conflict. For sanctions, only realist variables affect uncertainty levels. We also find some evidence of a substitution effect suggesting that factors that increase the likelihood of military conflict and the amount of uncertainty about military options tend to have the opposite effect when it comes to sanctions.

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Section: Hypothesis M5: Trade Links Decrease Uncertainty In Interstatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Uncertainty in International Crises

Bas¹,

McLean

Whang³

2017

kjis

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“…Given the important impact of UNSC resolutions on members of the UN and on international security generally, permanent members, especially the United States, have a strong incentive to pay costs as insurance. More importantly, permanent members can boost the legitimacy of their decisions by increasing the number of favorable votes (Chapman 2007;Hurd 2007;Voeten 2005). With heightened legitimacy, the US may enjoy strong domestic public support (Hurd 2007;Voeten 2001) or rally effects behind the President (Chapman and Reiter 2004).…”

Section: Vote Buying In the Un Security Councilmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?

Hwang

Sanford

Lee

2015

International Interactions

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Recent studies report that temporary members of the UN SecurityCouncil receive favorable treatment from the IMF, the World Bank, or in US foreign aid in exchange for their political support for permanent members. Nevertheless, few studies have examined whether this favorable treatment and these benefits have actually made any significant changes in the member states' voting behavior in the United Nations. To explore this question, we investigate whether membership on the UN Security Council influences a state's voting in the UN General Assembly. In the analysis of panel data for 197 countries over the period from 1946 to 2008, the empirical results show that elected members of the UN Security Council tend to behave similarly with permanent members, especially with the United States, as the number of loan programs signed with the IMF and the World Bank increases. Also, US foreign aid significantly increases temporary members' vote coincidence with the United States and other permanent members. In this regard, this article contributes to our understanding of state voting behavior and power politics in international organizations.

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“…As an example of this model, some international financial organizations -such as the World Bank and the IMF-adopted a weighted voting system appropriate for international collaboration missions. 47 In this context this paper proposes a weighted (financial and regional) representation system for the IPSAB. The fundamental controversy in reform discussions is which country would be a permanent or nonpermanent member of the Security Council.…”

Section: A New the Un Charter In Terms Of New Security Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%