The Political Strategies and Unity of the American Corporate Inner Circle: Evidence from Political Donations, 1982–2000

Abstract

Recent work has offered competing explanations for the long-term evolution of corporate political action in the United States. In one, scholars have theorized that long-term structural changes in the American political and economic landscape may have radically transformed inter-corporate network structures and changed the political orientation of corporate elites. In another, a small group of corporate elites continues to dominate government policy by advocating for class-wide interests through occupying key positions in government and policy planning groups. We offer new evidence of patterns in and predictors of political strategies among the nation’s elite corporate directors. We utilize an original dataset (the Longitudinal Elite Contributor Database) linked with registries of corporate directors and their board memberships. We ask: (1) has the political activity, unity, or pragmatism of the corporate elite declined since 1982; and (2) are individuals who direct multiple firms more pragmatic in their political action? Evidence suggests that corporate elites are more politically active and unified, and continue to exercise pragmatic political strategies vis-à-vis their campaign donations. Using random- and fixed-effects models, we present evidence to suggest that becoming a member of the inner circle has a significant moderating effect on elite political behavior. We offer an alternative mechanism of elite coordination that may help explain the continued political cohesion of the corporate elite.

Sources of Continued Corporate Dominance

“…As it turns out, the proportion of Fortune 500 directors that sit on two or more boards has remained stable, even as overall density in the network falls. As table 1 shows, while big linkers may have disappeared, the inner circle of individuals directing multiple companies has not (Heerwig and Murray, 2018). Davis et al (2003); 1990 from Davis (1991;; and 2010 from this study-Study population differs across the sources.…”

“…For instance, individuals that direct multiple companies have, in the past, been more likely than their single company counterparts to provide advisory service to the government, governance of non-profits institutions, and to have contact with the media (Useem, 1984: 76-79, 87-90). In addition, inner circle status influences individual political donation patterns (Heerwig and Murray, 2018;Burris, 2001), and the common presence of inner circle members on the boards of two companies increases the unity of their PACs political donations (Murray, 2017).…”

“…First, one of the only individual political behavior that is recorded is campaign donations of over $200 as required by the Federal Election Commission (FEC). Second, the FEC data on individual donations is formatted where each observation is a single donation, rather than donor; and there is no unique identifier for donors (Heerwig, 2018). This makes analysis of individual donations extremely difficult.…”

“…Political Mobilization: In most studies of corporate political behavior that examine the role of corporate networks, the measure of political activity is campaign donations (for example, see Clawson and Neustadtl, 1989;Mizruchi, 1989;1992, Burris andSalt, 1990;Burris, 2000;2001;2005;Murray, 2014;Heerwig and Murray, 2018) 25 . The problem with this is that it is impossible to fully distinguish what portion of the findings of these studies is generalizable to other forms of corporate political activity.…”

Beyond donors: Toward a sociology of campaign expenditures

“…Campaign contributions made by political society, whether from organizations or individuals, are tools for indicating social carriers, pointing out which groups are connected to whom and the ideologies they may be wishing to push. Following donation patterns is a long‐established practice for tracing political activity and cohesion among political and corporate elite (Burris, 2005; Heerwig, 2018; Heerwig & Murray, 2019; Mizruchi, 1989). Campaign finance reform influences who donates money, how much they donate, and how money is raised and spent within civil society (Hertel‐Fernandez et al., 2018; Miller, 1986; Peoples, 2013).…”