This article examines the emergency election campaign launched by the Haredi parties in anticipation of the 2013 general elections in Israel with a view to attracting the votes of those generally perceived as their automatic supportersthe Haredim.Over the past four decades, elections in Israel have generally been opportunities for a show of force by the Haredi parties. Voter turnout in Haredi areas has been high, with almost universal ideological loyalty to the centrist Haredi parties -the Sefardi Shas party and the Ashkenazi United Torah Judaism (UTJ) (Yahadut ha-Torah) party. Their campaigns aimed to broaden their electorate, appealing to voters outside of the Haredi sector. Shas was successful in this endeavour, establishing its power base with voters who were, in many cases, not themselves Haredim. United Torah Judaism was less successful in this regard. The vast majority of the party's voters are Haredim. While Shas could rely on the religious influence of its rabbis on Mizrahi 1 traditionalists 2 as well as on active religious outreach, 3 UTJ relied mainly on the demographic growth of Haredi society.In the run-up to the 2013 general elections, something seemed to be going wrong. Trends of change that had appeared in the first years of the previous decade had now hardened into facts. First of all, Haredi society had grown. However, this demographic growth did not necessarily mean increased power. Growth had brought diversity and a multitude of internal challenges. For