The politics and economics of wool marketing, 1950–2000

Abstract

The history of marketing, research, development policies and intervention in marketing of the wool clip is reviewed from the perspective of an insider. The overall theme is that politics took over comprehensively from clear economic policy advice on wool marketing in the past 50 years and woolgrowers paid a high price for this. The idea of`integrated marketing' including an export monopoly, a bu¡er stock scheme and coordinated promotion and R&D, collectively a strong interventionist philosophy, has waxed and waned. Having borne most of the costs of these failed policies, remaining woolgrowers can now look forward to a market less distorted by political interference.

Auction Price Anomalies: Evidence from Wool Auctions in Australia*

“…11 The sample period coincided with changes in interventions in wool markets. Though the reserve price floor had ended, the stockpile of wool held by WI was sold off roughly in accordance with what the market could bear (Richardson 2001), which varied over the sample period (Haszler et al 1996). However, we are interested in what happens to the price of wool throughout a single auction lasting 1-4 days and not on what happens across auctions.…”

Counting the cost: the reserve price scheme for wool 1970‐2001

“…The administration of the RPS for wool, the only Australian commodity subject to such this form of market intervention, and of that dealing with the aftermath spawned a large literature from agricultural and applied economists (see, for instance, Watson ; Vines Report ; Gunasekera and Fisher ; Hone and Hope ; Hertzler ; Haszler et al . ; Turnell ; Richardson ; Abbott ). While Richardson (), Abbott (), Ville and Merrett () and Massy () have provided narratives of the political and economic imperatives that gave rise to the introduction and operation of the RPS and its ultimate demise, these authors apportion blame to many of the participants, particularly senior officials in the statutory bodies, their advisors and politicians of various hues.…”

“…; Turnell ; Richardson ; Abbott ). While Richardson (), Abbott (), Ville and Merrett () and Massy () have provided narratives of the political and economic imperatives that gave rise to the introduction and operation of the RPS and its ultimate demise, these authors apportion blame to many of the participants, particularly senior officials in the statutory bodies, their advisors and politicians of various hues. There is a wide consensus that the RPS was a failure of significant proportions imposing costs on the growers, taxpayers and the wool industry; however, past estimates of the extent of the cost and scale of the policy failure are few, and vary widely.…”

“…This exercise observes how well the AWC performed as a private speculator in the market. Our estimates differ from both Massy () and Richardson ().…”

‘Riding on the Sheep’s Back’: Examining Australia’s Dependence on Wool Exports

“…SeeRichardson (2001) for an overview of historical developments in the politics and economics of wool marketing in the period since the Korean War.…”