2017
DOI: 10.1017/9781316875582
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The Politics of Bureaucratic Corruption in Post-Transitional Eastern Europe

Abstract: Using a mix of ethnographic, survey, and comparative historical methodologies, this book offers an unprecedented insight into the corruption economies of Ukrainian and Belarusian universities, hospitals, and secondary schools. Its detailed analysis suggests that political turnover in hybrid political regimes has a strong impact on petty economic crime in service-provision bureaucracies. Theoretically, the book rejects the dominant paradigm that attributes corruption to the allegedly ongoing political transitio… Show more

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Cited by 53 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…Tapping into these networks to access an appropriate and interested bribe-taker is imperative; and the bigger the personal networks, the more likely citizens are to succeed. Case studies from Russia and other nondemocratic regimes provide indirect evidence that corruption success increases with the number and diversity of service-providers, officials, and organizational insiders that a bribe-giver can reach (Humphrey, 2012;Oka, 2019;Rose, 2000;Zaloznaya, 2017). Besides having large networks, I also expect bribe-givers to have ties to well-connected others who are capable of building pathways that extend beyond bribe-givers' own connections.…”
Section: Relational Foundations Of Public Sector Corruption In Russiamentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Tapping into these networks to access an appropriate and interested bribe-taker is imperative; and the bigger the personal networks, the more likely citizens are to succeed. Case studies from Russia and other nondemocratic regimes provide indirect evidence that corruption success increases with the number and diversity of service-providers, officials, and organizational insiders that a bribe-giver can reach (Humphrey, 2012;Oka, 2019;Rose, 2000;Zaloznaya, 2017). Besides having large networks, I also expect bribe-givers to have ties to well-connected others who are capable of building pathways that extend beyond bribe-givers' own connections.…”
Section: Relational Foundations Of Public Sector Corruption In Russiamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…America, Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East document widespread illicit payments, favors, and string-pulling in schools, utility services, permit-issuing agencies, police precincts, courts, tax administrations, and other bureaucracies (Ijewereme, 2015;Mbate, 2018;Monem and Baniamin, 2017;Sabet, 2013;Zaloznaya, 2017). In the literature, such exchanges go by different names; hereafter, I use terms public sector, petty, and bureaucratic corruption interchangeably.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Definitions range from moralistic, which capture a wide range of behaviors harming the public good (Ermann & Lundman, 1996;Simon & Eitzen, 1990), to the explicitly criminal, such as the 17 federal statutes used by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (Cordis & Milyo, 2016). As with criminal behavior, corruption exists in contrast to noncorrupt behavior, and as such, the boundaries rely on local norms, laws, and culture (Fisman & Miguel, 2006;Hoang, 2018;Polese, 2008;Zaloznaya, 2017). At its core, corruption is a crime of the powerful leveraged from an occupational position for economic or political gain.…”
Section: Corruptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While socio‐legal scholarship about post‐Soviet citizens' relationship to courts and litigation can help understand fishing firms', fishermen's and DBR administrators' legal conundrums, it does not provide a clear‐cut answer as to why litigation was pursued. In Ukraine, scholars have highlighted issues such as the “weak demand for the rule of law” (Burlyuk, 2015), the politicization of justice (Popova, 2012), the impact of the state bureaucracy's (mal)functioning on lower civil courts (Kurkchiyan, 2013), bureaucratic corruption (Zaloznaya, 2017), and how private property's introduction undermined democratic community formation (Eppinger, 2015). On the one hand, they note high levels of litigation among Ukrainian and Russian citizens (Hendley, 2015; Popova, 2012).…”
Section: Litigating For Legality Disputing Territoriality: At the Con...mentioning
confidence: 99%