The Politics of Co-optation

Bertocchi, Graziella; Spagat, Michael

doi:10.1006/jcec.2001.1734

Cited by 71 publications

(53 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…One of the central results of our paper echoes the above finding of Bertocchi and Spagat (2001). We add, however, the qualification that (relatively -but not too) weak rulers will selectively choose to bribe the society's strongest individuals, while (relatively) strong rulers diversify the composition of their clientele.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 76%

“…The associated trade-off is that a larger clientele makes the regime safer but is also costlier to sustain (see also North et al, 2009). The trade-off between the clientele's size and the cooptation cost is also underlined in Bertocchi and Spagat (2001). In their setting, the individual cooptation cost is endogenous, and weak (strong) governments distribute large (small) benefits to few (many) clients.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Until the fall of the USSR in 1991, the policies of all Soviet Union's strongmen heavily relied on the system of Communist Party membership that institutionalized cooptation (Bertocchi and Spagat, 2001). With the rise of Stalin to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's Central Committee in 1922, the whole clientelistic network underwent dramatic changes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Endogenous elites: power structure and patron-client relationships

Sekeris

2010

Econ Gov

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In weak institutional settings, autocrats barter political and economic concessions for support to remain in power and extract rents. Instead of viewing the favors' beneficiaries, i.e. the elites, as an exogenous entity, we allow the king to decide whom to coopt provided the subjects are heterogeneous in the potential support -their strength -they could bring to the regime. While the ruler can select the elites on the basis of their personal characteristics, an alternative strategy consists in introducing some uncertainty in the cooptation process. The latter strategy allows the king to reduce the clients' cooptation price since in the event of a revolution the likelihood of being included in the future body of elites is lower. We show that weak rulers are more likely to coopt the society's strongest individuals, while powerful rulers diversify the composition of their clientele. Moreover, when agents value more future discounted outcomes, the king is more likely to randomly coopt subjects. Weak institutions Autocracy Rent seeking Elites

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 76%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Endogenous elites: power structure and patron-client relationships

Sekeris

2010

Econ Gov

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“…For 2 , 0 2 ( ), the interpretation is that in any bilateral bargain, bargaining power is equivalent to the amount of the available surplus that can grab relative to 0 ; clearly, g( ; 0 ; ) = 1 g( 0 ; ; ). Conditional on = i, E i is the stronger elite therefore by de…nition g(E i ; E j ; i) = g(E i ; W 1 ; i) = 1: 18 14 Our results would not change qualitatively if we partially relax this assumption by allowing both W 1 and E j to extract some surplus from the strongest elite, as long as this amount is small enough. 15 Therefore, one can think at as a shock increasing the value of the production factor owned by one elite (like an increase of oil price or a dramatic factor intensive technological shocks), so that the elite blessed by nature can then use this wealth to acquire guns or hire an army in order to extract the social surplus.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 76%

Democracy, collective action and intra-elite conflict

Ghosal¹,

Proto²

2009

Journal of Public Economics

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This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite con ‡ict leads to a democracy. There are two risk averse elites competing for the appropriation of a unit of social surplus, with an ex-ante uncertainty about their future relative bargaining power, and a large non-elite class unable to act collectively. We characterize a democracy as consistng of both franchise extension to, and lowering the cost of collective political activity for, individuals in the non-elite. In the absence of democracy, the stronger elite is always able to appropriate the entire surplus. We show that in a democracy, the newly enfranchised non-elite organize and always prefer to form a coalition with weaker elite against the stronger resulting in a more balanced surplus allocation between the two elites. Accordingly, the elites choose to democratize if they are suf…ciently risk averse. Our formal analysis can account for stylized facts that emerge from a comparative analysis of Indian and Western European democracies.Keywords: Democracy, con ‡ict, collective action, coalition formation, party formation, bargaining, risk-sharing.JEL Classi…cation: D74, O12, H11.We thank Daron Acemoglu, Pranhab Bardhan, Francis Bloch, Steve Broadberry, Oded Galor, Mark Harrison, Alessandro Lizzeri, Ben Lockwood, Miltos Makris, Omer Moav, Joel Mokyr, Sharun Mukand, Andrew Newman, Jim Robinson and Juuso Valimaki for helpful comments and suggestions. The obvious disclaimer applies.

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“…In the absence of a possibility to commit to fiscal policies, the elite is forced to extend the franchise. Conley and Temimi (2001) and Bertocchi and Spagat (2001) provide similar theories in which a larger conflict potential of the disenfranchised population increases the likelihood for them to be allocated voting rights. Our theory also delivers the possibility of an alternative transition scenario in which the process of democratization may represent a Pareto-improvement.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Consensual and Conflictual Democratization

Cervellati¹,

Fortunato²,

Sunde

2012

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Consensual and Conflictual DemocratizationMatteo Cervellati Piergiuseppe Fortunato Uwe Sunde D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S ABSTRACT Consensual and Conflictual Democratization *We study the process of endogenous democratization from inefficient oligarchic systems in an economy where heterogeneous individuals can get involved in predation activities. The features of democracies are shown to be crucially related to the conditions under which democratization initially takes place. The political regime and the extent of redistribution implemented under it depend on the allocation of de facto political power across the different social groups. The cost of public enforcement of property rights depends on the extent of predation activities in the economy. The theory highlights the importance of inequality in natural resources and availability of human capital for endogenous democratic transitions. Multiple politico-economic equilibria can be sustained conditional on expectations about property rights enforcement. This generates history dependence. Democratic transitions supported by a large consensus serve as coordination device and lead to better protection of property and more stable political systems than democratic transitions imposed in conflictual environments. We test the novel predictions using available cross-country data. The link between the type of democratic transition and the outcomes under democracy is also investigated using novel data on constitutional principles. The findings support the theoretical predictions.JEL Classification: H10, O20, N10

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The Politics of Co-optation

Cited by 71 publications

References 7 publications

Endogenous elites: power structure and patron-client relationships

Endogenous elites: power structure and patron-client relationships

Democracy, collective action and intra-elite conflict

Consensual and Conflictual Democratization

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