The politics of constitutional amendment in postcommunist Europe

Abstract

Constitution, Constitutional amendment, Democracy, Democratic transition, H11, K00, P37,

Institutions and the stabilization of party systems in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe

“…For Hungary details see Sajó (1996) and Elster et al (1998). For details on Macedonia, Croatia and Slovenia see Aceuska (1996) and Roberts (2009). Although conditions for initial constitutional debate in Moldova and Ukraine were not ideal, in both cases bargaining occurred in parliaments.…”

Comparing Constitutional Change in European Union Member States: In Search of a Theory

“…Second, there is a scarcity of studies that focus on both explicit and implicit constitutional change. The research done on explicit constitutional change has contributed to extending our knowledge on differences between existing types of amendment procedures, how often constitutions are amended and what explains variation in amendment frequency (Ferejohn, ; Lutz, ; Rasch and Congleton, ; Roberts, ). In one of the first attempts to explain cross‐national variation in constitutional amendment rates (that is, how often constitutions are amended) Lutz shows that the variance can be attributed to two main variables: ‘the length of the constitution and the difficulty of the amendment process’ (Lutz, , p. 365).…”

“…Previous research on constitutional change has been occupied, with few exceptions (for example, Behnke and Benz, ; Contiades, ; Oliver and Fusaro, ), with studying either explicit or implicit constitutional change – the one or the other. As a result, we know quite a bit about how often constitutions are amended and what explains variation in amendment frequency (Ferejohn, ; Lutz, ; Rasch and Congleton, ; Roberts, ). We also have some knowledge about what different forms implicit constitutional change may take (Rasch and Congleton, ; Voigt, 1999a), and how important courts have been as drivers for implicit change (Benz, ).…”

Constitutional Amendments and the Consolidation of the Rule of Law in Democratizing Francophone West Africa: Case Study of Benin, Burkina Faso, and Senegal

“…A less-than-successful constitutional system will have a high rate of constitutional replacement (Lutz 1994, p.367) The question then becomes, what should be perceived as a moderate rate of amendments? Roberts (2009) and Lutz (1994) try to address the issue through some hypotheses. Even though both authors worked based on the same hypotheses (the former repeatedly citing the latter), they end up with different views on how important an amendment rate is for a constitution.…”

“…In other words, frequent constitutional amendments are viewed as suspicious in the sense that they raised some doubts about the commitment of a country to democratic principles (Lutz, 1994;Sturn, 1970). The conventional wisdom suggests that as the frequency of constitutional revisions increases, the likelihood of the executive branch of government getting more powers at the expense of civil rights increases (Roberts, 2009). 9 Based on these assumptions, some scholars (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962;Riker, 1982) believe that new democracies should adopt rigid constitutions to secure freedom and rights for citizens against potential tyranny from the executive power or the majority.…”