The Politics of Governing Oil Effectively: A Comparative Study of Two New Oil-Rich States in Africa

Abstract

The challenges facing developing countries with new-found natural resource wealth are generally understood in terms of whether they have the institutions of 'good governance' required to avoid the resource curse. New insights from a political settlements perspective show how deeper forms of politics and power relations play a more significant role than such institutions, and help explain some counter-intuitive findings regarding how 'semi-authoritarian' Uganda seems to be governing oil somewhat more in line with its national interest as compared to 'democratic' Ghana. We find that bureaucratic 'pockets of effectiveness' play a critical role, with outcomes shaped by the nature of their embedded autonomy vis-à-vis different kinds of ruling coalition. Efforts to promote 'best-practice' governance reforms in such contexts might be misplaced, and could be replaced with a stronger focus on building specific forms of state capacity and a greater acceptance that 'developmental collusion' between political and bureaucratic actors may offer more appropriate or 'best-fit' solutions.

The Politics of Bureaucratic ‘Pockets of Effectiveness’: Insights from Ghana’s Ministry of Finance

“…As a result, some observers note that 'Pockets of efficiency are difficult to create under Competitive Clientelism' (Whitfield et al, 2015: 106). Hickey et al (2015) show that even where such agencies are created in countries characterised by competitive clientelism, as with Ghana's National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), their endurance can easily be undermined by policy discontinuities engendered by interparty political rivalries.…”

“…Roll's (2014a) notion of 'effective political management' as a necessary condition for establishing and maintaining PoEs comes into play here. Importantly, political elites are likely to tolerate greater organisational discretion when they have interpersonal ties with organisational leaders, as was the case of the GNPC under Tsatsu Tsikata during the 1980s-1990s (Hickey et al, 2015;Opoku, 2010). As McDonnell (2017: 498) aptly puts it: 'significant discretion is only tolerated where loyalty is assured'.…”

The Politics of State Capacity and Development in Africa: Reframing and Researching ‘Pockets of Effectiveness’

“…The commitment of political elites to protecting agencies from the worst excesses of political interference is widely acknowledged as a critical condition for success (Geddes 1990). For Whitfield et al (2015: 20), and in a finding that resonates with ESID's research on oil technocracies in Ghana and Uganda (Hickey et al 2015a), '…state capabilities are the product of underlying political relationships and not independent from them. State bureaucrats in charge of industrial policy must have political backing from ruling elites and a significant degree of autonomy from political pressures stemming from within the ruling coalition' (Whitfield et al 2015: 20).…”

“…There is some evidence that PoEs are more likely to be protected and sustained in 'dominant' settings, where implementation capacities, long-term vision and stability may be at higher levels (e.g. Hertog 2014, Hout 2013, Roll 2014 and that increased levels of competition for political power can make it very difficult to protect and sustain such PoEs (Hickey et al 2015a, cf. Levy 2014, Whitfield et al 2015.…”

Donor-supported approaches to improving extractives governance: Lessons from Nigeria and Ghana

“…FOSTER's response to these conditions was to work opportunistically and strategically with proreform supply-and demand-side forces within the Nigerian context, seeking out collaboration with 'pockets of effectiveness' (Hickey et al 2015;Leonard 2008)-testing and confirming the hypotheses and findings from the broader research arena, which suggested that such locales exist, even in weak-governance environments. In particular, FOSTER's theory of change is based on identifying and supporting these pro-reform pockets of effectiveness among two types of organizations:…”