The Politics of Minister Retention in Presidential Systems: Technocrats, Partisans, and Government Approval

Abstract

Presidents and prime ministers often introduce policy adjustments by reallocating cabinet portfolios and shield their favorite policies by protecting key cabinet members. Individual minister profiles are a crucial factor in guiding such decisions. The retention of politically savvy partisan ministers helps consolidate legislative support while the retention of technocrats, who are less vulnerable to the pressures of political parties and constituents, guarantees policy continuity. Different types of ministers are therefore protected or sacked in different political contexts. Given these alternatives, what types of ministers enjoy longer tenures and under what conditions? How do individual profiles and electoral incentives affect minister turnover?We argue that the effect of ministers' profiles on portfolio reallocation is conditioned by the popular approval of an administration. When the government is unpopular, the loyalty of cabinet members to the chief executive is fragile, and external factors drive cabinet turnover. Partisan ministers leave the cabinet as the government coalition crumbles, and technical ministers are replaced in response to public pressures. In such contexts, government chiefs only command the loyalty of an inner circle of ministers who are without partisan careers or independent policy agendas. When the government is very popular, by contrast, the cabinet aligns with the chief executive, and external pressures for cabinet turnover decline. In the latter scenario, partisan and technical ministers tend to be safe in their posts, but technocrats in charge of the administration's successful policies have more leverage and a lower risk of exit than most partisan ministers.As a result, the conventional distinction between partisan and non-partisan ministers proves insufficient to understand retention strategies. While weak heads of government are forced to engage in defensive reallocation strategies, which result in a higher rate of turnover for most ministers, strong executives can engage in unilateral portfolio reallocation in order to strengthen their control of the cabinet. This pattern typically 315

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