The Politics of Presidential Term Limits 2019
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198837404.003.0008
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The Politics of Presidential Term Limits in Mexico

Abstract: In Mexico’s presidential system, the struggle over term limits was at the heart of efforts to institutionalize regimes from 1857 through 1933. Before the 1910 Revolution, Porfirio Díaz both called for his predecessors’ overthrow by appealing to the principle of no-re-election and then manipulated that principle in order to stay in power. The rallying cry of the 1910 Revolution became “Effective Suffrage, No-Reelection.” Despite a late-1920s effort to backpedal from no-re-election, the principle has been scrupu… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Instead term limits were used as an instrument of authoritarian rule by the Somozas, who formally handed over the presidential office to a safe replacement three times without relinquishing de facto power – a practice Luis Somoza derided as ‘changing the monkey’ (Close 2019). The enduring Mexican ‘perfect dictatorship’ prior to 2000 was not only compatible with strict term limits but these were also central to its interacting with other institutional features (Klesner 2019). Despite such episodes, the overall balance across Latin America indicates that between 1945 and 2018 democracy has been better off when term limits were in place than when they were not.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Instead term limits were used as an instrument of authoritarian rule by the Somozas, who formally handed over the presidential office to a safe replacement three times without relinquishing de facto power – a practice Luis Somoza derided as ‘changing the monkey’ (Close 2019). The enduring Mexican ‘perfect dictatorship’ prior to 2000 was not only compatible with strict term limits but these were also central to its interacting with other institutional features (Klesner 2019). Despite such episodes, the overall balance across Latin America indicates that between 1945 and 2018 democracy has been better off when term limits were in place than when they were not.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As a rule, personalist authoritarian rulers are also endowed with extensive constitutional competences as the formal foundation of their power (Frye 2002), and redistributions of competences within the executive-for example, between the president and the government-signal to informal networks where the real power in the state is located (Hale 2011). Moreover, in less personalized regimes such as in Mexico during the rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), presidential term limits can provide a meaningful constraint to presidential power (Klesner 2019). Also, many African constitutions contain rules about leadership succession that are regularly abided by (Meng 2020).…”
Section: Constitutions In Authoritarian Regimesmentioning
confidence: 99%