The Politics of Promoting Social Protection in Zambia

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on 'The political economy of social protection systems', which is part of a larger research project on 'The economics and politics of taxation and social protection'. Terms of use: Documents in Copyright © UNU-WIDER 2016Information and requests: publications@wider.unu.edu ISSN 1798-7237 ISBN 978-92-9256-200-7 Typescript prepared by Sophie Richmond.The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research provides economic analysis and policy advice with the aim of promoting sustainable and equitable development. The Institute began operations in 1985 in Helsinki, Finland, as the first research and training centre of the United Nations University. Today it is a unique blend of think tank, research institute, and UN agency-providing a range of services from policy advice to governments as well as freely available original research.The Institute is funded through income from an endowment fund with additional contributions to its work programme from Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, FinlandThe views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or the United Nations University, nor the programme/project donors.Abstract: This paper examines the rise of the social protection agenda in Zambia, and demonstrates that this has two alternative drivers: shifting dynamics within Zambia's political settlement and the promotional efforts of a transnational policy coalition. We compare the cases of social cash transfers and social health insurance to investigate how the interplay of these drivers has shaped the uneven commitment to the respective policies. Social protection has yet to displace existing interests, ideas, and rent-allocation practices. However, cash transfers are gaining localized support. What matters now is the way in which such transfers become integrated within Zambia's distributional regime.

The negotiated politics of social protection in sub-Saharan Africa

“…In the extreme case of Zambia, Pruce and Hickey (2016) show that pilot programmes operated for ten years before the national government began to expand them, despite the use of reformist discourse in planning documents. In Lesotho, Granvik (2016) argues that donors were important in the partial introduction of a child grant, but not in the earlier and more fulsome introduction of old age pensions.…”

“…Similarly, in Ethiopia, as Lavers (2016a) has shown, a rare moment of coordination between donors during the 2003 food crisis forced the government to engage in the discussions that led to the PSNP, while the subsequent donor fragmentation over the design of the programme enabled the government to dictate key aspects of the design. Donor coordination around a shared agenda also helped give impetus to social assistance reforms adopted in Zambia, as the study by Pruce and Hickey (2016) indicates.…”

“…A very different process unfolded in Uganda and Zambia, as shown by Hickey and Bukenya (2016) and Pruce and Hickey (2016). While ruling parties in these countries periodically express a desire to pursue developmental or social democratic agendas, these are inconsistently applied in practice, not least as a result of the necessity of elite coalition building and rent distribution that undermines developmental impulses.…”

“…Likewise, in Lesotho, Granvik (2016) argues that the social pension was introduced in a period of political dominance and stability, although the pension payment rates subsequently became a focus for competition between political parties promising voters ever higher rates. In Zambia, Hickey and Pruce (2016) show that the expansion of the social cash transfer programme followed the change of government in 2011, although this has not been an issue in the election itself. Furthermore, in Uganda, Hickey and Bukenya (2016) show that the addition of a fifteenth district in the original pilot was linked to the ruling party's political strategy for building support in the opposition-leaning north of the country, while the subsequent roll out of the scheme was intended to provide visible state transfers in the lead-up to presidential elections in 2016.…”

“…For example, new evidence that the rate of poverty reduction was declining helped convince some bureaucrats and politicians in countries like Rwanda and Zambia that new policy solutions were required. In Zambia, bureaucrats who had been co-opted into transnational policy coalitions in support of social assistance were able to point to evaluation evidence from randomized control trials that revealed the social cash transfer scheme to be more effective and efficient than other government interventions (Pruce and Hickey 2016).…”