The Politics of Public Good Provision: Evidence from Indian Local Governments

Besley, Timothy; Pande, Rohini; Rahman, Lupin; Rao, Vijayendra

doi:10.1162/154247604323068104

Cited by 266 publications

(177 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…La Ferrara (2002) provides evidence from Tanzanian villages of 16 such complex interaction between village-level inequality and group organization; perhaps most interestingly for our current discussion, in more unequal villages, individuals are less likely to report trust in the community, and more likely to report conflict of interest. There is more rigorous and detailed evidence from India on the role of historic institutions of inequality in influencing breakdowns in collective action for broad public goods (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005;Andersen, 2011), dissolution of social cooperation (Fehr, Hoff, et al, 2008), and weak performance of government poverty alleviation programs (Besley et al, 2004).…”

Section: Accountability and Civil Society Organizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Civil Society, Public Action and Accountability in Africa

Devarajan¹,

Khemani²,

Walton³

2011

Policy Research Working Papers

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Section: Accountability and Civil Society Organizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Civil Society, Public Action and Accountability in Africa

Devarajan¹,

Khemani²,

Walton³

2011

Policy Research Working Papers

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“…10 While Panchayat legislation requires that the Pradhan decide the choice of beneficiaries and public good allocation in consultation with villagers and village councillors, final decision-making powers remain vested with the Pradhan. Though the precise scope of GP policy activism varies across states, the GP is typically responsible for beneficiary selection for government welfare schemes and the construction and maintenance of village public goods.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, beneficiary selection was discussed in only 22% of Gram Sabha meetings (Besley, Pande and Rao (2005)). This is also reflected 10 On average, roughly 10 percent of a GP's total revenue comes from own revenues with the remainder consisting of transfers from higher levels of government.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India

Besley

Pande

Rao³

2011

The World Bank Economic Review

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128

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This paper uses data on elected village councils in South India to examine the political economy of public resource allocation. We find that the pattern of policy-making reflects politicians' self-interest. Elected councillors benefit from improved personal access to public resources. In addition, the head councillor's group identity and residence influences public resource allocation.While electoral incentives do not eliminate politician opportunism, voters appear able to use their electoral clout to gain greater access to public resources.

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“…Ban and Rao(2008a), on the other hand, …nd that women leaders do not in ‡uence the provision of public goods and that their performance is hampered by the presence of a large upper caste landowner faction. Chattopadhyay and Du ‡o(2004a), and Besley, Pande and Rao(2004b) …nd that reservations for disadvantaged castes yield bene…ts to the members of these castes in the village.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Deliberation Equitable? Evidence From Transcripts Of Village Meetings In South India

Ban¹,

Rao²

2009

Policy Research Working Papers

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Deliberative decision-making processes are becoming increasingly important around the world to make important decisions about public and private goods allocation, but there is very little empirical evidence about how they actually work. In this paper the authors use data from India extracted from 131 transcripts of village meetings matched with data from household surveys conducted in the same villages prior to the meetings, to study whose preferences are reflected in the meetings. The meetings are constitutionally empowered to make decisions about public and private goods. The findings show that the more land a person owns, the This paper-a product of the Poverty Team, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the department to understand local government and citizen-based engagement in developing countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at vrao@worldbank.org.higher the likelihood her preference is mentioned in the meeting, the longer the amount of time spent discussing this preference, and the higher the likelihood that a decision to provide or repair this public or private good is taken. At the same time, the voices of disadvantaged castes, while not dominating the meeting, are also heard. By contrast, the preferences of Muslims are given less time. High village literacy and the presence of higher level officials during village meetings mitigate the power of the landed, but political reservations for low castes for the post of village president increase the power of the landed.

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The Politics of Public Good Provision: Evidence from Indian Local Governments

Cited by 266 publications

References 12 publications

Civil Society, Public Action and Accountability in Africa

Civil Society, Public Action and Accountability in Africa

Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India

Is Deliberation Equitable? Evidence From Transcripts Of Village Meetings In South India

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