2014
DOI: 10.1017/s0022216x14001060
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The Politics of Sentencing Reform in Brazil: Autonomous Bureaucrats, Constrained Politicians and Gradual Policy Change

Abstract: Popular attitudes towards crime in Latin America induce local legislators to support harsh sentencing frameworks. What, therefore, explains the adoption of non-prison sentences across the region? Using Brazil as a case study, this article claims that sentencing reform is a consequence of the growing autonomy of bureaucrats who manage the criminal justice system. Insulated from patronage networks and granted broad mandates to pursue solutions to pressing penal crises, these policy elites use their position in t… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(10 citation statements)
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References 17 publications
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“…While repressive authoritarian regimes retrenched spending on health and education (Huber, Mustillo, & Stephens, 2008) democratic regimes often fail to provide sufficient resources to public agencies (e.g., Alcañiz, 2016; Repetto, 2000). And although some bureaucracies have achieved a degree of autonomy from politicians (Eaton, 2003; Nunes, 2015), a great many others continue to face interference from their political principals (Batista da Silva, 2011; Ferraro, 2008), impeding bureaucrats’ abilities to implement and regulate policy.…”
Section: Politics and Administrationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While repressive authoritarian regimes retrenched spending on health and education (Huber, Mustillo, & Stephens, 2008) democratic regimes often fail to provide sufficient resources to public agencies (e.g., Alcañiz, 2016; Repetto, 2000). And although some bureaucracies have achieved a degree of autonomy from politicians (Eaton, 2003; Nunes, 2015), a great many others continue to face interference from their political principals (Batista da Silva, 2011; Ferraro, 2008), impeding bureaucrats’ abilities to implement and regulate policy.…”
Section: Politics and Administrationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…With abandonment of dictatorship (1964 to 1985) and a return to electoral democracy in the 1980s, policing and incarceration of the poor along ethno-racial divisions became a political strategy across party lines to shore up legitimacy. This occurred amid pervasive violence, public demands for tougher crime policies, and intensifying “rule of law” and “human rights” discourses in a globalizing field of power projecting western ideals of acceptable modes of punishment (Nunes 2015; Paschel 2018; Skidmore 1990; Wacquant 2008). Since then, state authorities have incarcerated an unprecedented number of people.…”
Section: From Dungeons To Modernizing Carceral Administrationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Until Lula’s victory in 2002, the justice ministry had been used as currency in the building of congressional alliances, resulting in a staggering sixteen ministers between 1990 and 2003. Bastos, however, was not a career politician, remained in the post for the duration of Lula’s first term, and during his tenure, the ministry enjoyed great technical capacity and bureaucratic autonomy (Nunes, 2015). To move the amendment forward, he established an Office of Judicial Reform designed to build social and political support for the proposed changes.…”
Section: Legal Mobilisation Political Influence and Pdo Autonomymentioning
confidence: 99%