The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A Political Economy Model of U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994

Abstract

A growing body of empirical research addresses the influence of domestic political and economic circumstances on the use of force. Most models explain the use of force as a function of various domestic and international demands for military force. This article uses data on U.S. uses of force between 1949 and 1994 to test a model that also considers the influence of these conditions on the supply of this policy instrument. Conditions that have complementary demand and supply effects—making military force both more useful and less costly to employ—are associated with frequent U.S. uses of force in the postwar era. These conditions include high unemployment, strong investor confidence, wartime presidential election years, and the absence of ongoing wars. Some of these same conditions contribute to a motivated bias in international threat perception, leading U.S. decision makers to perceive more opportunities for the use of force when it is most convenient for them to employ it.

Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection

“…Some scholars have suggested that this dynamic should apply primarily to democratic leaders because of their dependence on public support for maintaining office and because of their inability to use more direct methods of dampening domestic dissent (Richards et al 1993, Downs & Rocke 1995, Gelpi 1997. Consistent with this expectation, several studies of American foreign policy indicate that presidents have been more likely to use military force when their approval ratings have been in decline (Ostrom & Job 1986, James & Oneal 1991, Fordham 1998. Other studies have indicated-contrary to the diversionary logic-that U.S. presidents have been more likely to use military force when economic conditions have been favorable (Lian & Oneal 1993, Meernik & Waterman 1996.…”

Diversionary Dragons, or “Talking Tough in Taipei”: Cross-Strait Relations in the New Millennium

“…Blaming an economic downturn on China potentially would enhance the argument that Taiwan depends on the mainland for its economic development, consequently weakening the president's advocacy of a more independent Taiwan. In light of Fordham's (1998aFordham's ( , 1998b) assessment of unemployment (not inflation) as a likely stimulant for the use of force, with support from the data in the US context, it becomes interesting to see what economic aspect(s) might emerge as important for Taiwan. If there is an economic story to be told, it obviously concerns something other than inflation or unemployment.…”

“…As a measurement for domestic economic performance, the so-called misery index has been widely used in previous studies on DT (James and Oneal 1991). Other scholars, such as Fordham (1998aFordham ( , 1998b and DeRouen (2000), used inflation and unemployment separately as indicators for domestic economic performance. We adopt the latter approach to give us a more detailed analysis of the domestic economic impact.…”

“…Fordham (2005), for example, produces an extremely insightful account of how "strategic conflict avoidance" could affect the degree of confirmation achieved by DT as a result of states being especially careful not to confront the United States when it is going through domestic difficulties that might create a disposition toward diversion. This result is not regarded as applicable to the context of Taiwan's relations with the PRC because it is inconceivable that the PRC would experience the same reluctance to upset Taiwan regardless of the latter's internal state of affairs.…”

Influence of the Presidential Inaugural Address on Audience Perceptions of Candidate Image and the State of the Nation

“…Not only is the public concerned with the economy (Fordham, 1998), but so is the president, as the president is viewed positively when the economy is prosperous (Eshbaught-Soha & Peake, 2005). This research leads me to include a question to assess how audiences view the current "economic situation" of our country.…”