The politics of value in urban development: Valuing conflict in agonistic pluralism

Abstract

In this article, we consider the role of value pluralism in theorising urban development and the politics of participatory planning. Rather than situating analyses of urban development in a monist or universalist ethics, where values are reducible to a single universal (e.g. human rights), or a normative pluralism based on the tension between different bearers of political value (e.g. liberty and equality), we argue for a plural ethics to make sense of the complex empirical reality of our cities. Post-consensus theories of planning treat the presence of conflict as an enduring reality in urban development, with Chantal Mouffe providing one way of conceptualising a productive politics of conflict. We extend Mouffe’s plural politics through an appeal to value pluralism in the form of anthropological theories of value. A better understanding of the plural and incommensurable nature of values not only contributes to our understanding of the operation of agonistic pluralism, it also provides a more robust theoretical account of how different urban actors in the city transition from antagonism to agonism, which Mouffe suggests is necessary for a more inclusive urban politics. The politics of value resides in the struggle for legitimacy of particular regimes of value; not just to determine economic value, but to define what value is, and how different values dominate, encompass or otherwise relate to one another. This moral politics approach, via value theory, provides one way of tracing an ethical urbanism that exists between conflict and consensus. It allows us to reframe the central challenge of agonistic pluralism as the transition from antagonistic positions, marked by moral intransigence and immutability, towards more flexible value positions that allow ‘adversaries’ to enter into a viable agonistic politics.

Conflicts in the functioning process urban communities: current state of research

“…Таким образом, конфликт рассматривается как одно из проявлений базовых противоречий современного общества. Здесь возможно возникновение более глубоких конфликтов, связанных не только с интересами, но и с ценностями различных групп горожан [49]. Критическое планирование предполагает открытое политическое высказывание, имеющее публичное звучание, и мобилизацию значительного количества людей для поддержки заявленной позиции.…”

From value to meaning: Exploring the ethical basis of Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism

“…In ‘The politics of value in urban development: Valuing conflicts in agonistic pluralism’, McAuliffe and Rogers (2019) critically examine the ethical basis of Chantal Mouffe’s (1993, 2000, 2005, 2013) agonistic pluralism. According to them, this is because Mouffe makes a sharp distinction between subjective and ethical or moral values that are beyond reason and political/normative values that are more susceptible to rational debate (McAuliffe and Rogers, 2019: 6). Rather than accepting that ‘not all values are beyond reason’ (p. 11), they claim that a marked distinction Mouffe subsequently makes between these values prohibits her from analysing, e.g., why people persist in fighting for particular radically distinct values (e.g.…”

“…Rather than accepting that ‘not all values are beyond reason’ (p. 11), they claim that a marked distinction Mouffe subsequently makes between these values prohibits her from analysing, e.g., why people persist in fighting for particular radically distinct values (e.g. truth, justice), empirical conditions that might facilitate what Mouffe calls the ‘democratic task’ of agonistic pluralism, or the transformation from more ethically driven antagonistic forms of politics towards more productive normative value-driven agonistic ones (McAuliffe and Rogers, 2019: 6).…”

“…This short response wishes not to gainsay McAuliffe and Rogers’ (2019) enormously insightful perspective they call ‘radical ethical pluralism’ (p. 11) but to merely point out that they may have overexaggerated the sharpness of the distinction Mouffe draws between the ethical and the normative values and mischaracterised Mouffe’s democratic task as a result. This would be a shame, for McAuliffe and Rogers (2019: 1) entirely agree with Mouffe in considering this task necessary for constructing genuinely open, inclusive and democratic planning practice.…”

“…Strictly speaking, then, the democratic task is in fact a possible way merely of carrying out politics. It involves differentiating and excluding ‘the enemy’ from ‘adversaries’, or friendly enemies, (Howarth, 2008: 178) and making contingent political decisions in the face of competing interpretations of the liberal democratic values or principles of liberty and equality for all (McAuliffe and Rogers, 2019: 5). Yet, for Mouffe (1993), the end of this task is much wider than this.…”