The Popular Culture of Agricultural Law Reform

Matching new entrants and retiring farmers through farm joint ventures: Insights from the Fresh Start Initiative in Cornwall, UK

“…Ravenscroft argues that the dyadic post-feudal system (wherein there is no government intervention) can leave the weaker party, usually the tenant, vulnerable to exploitation and the landowner, usually the dominant party, in a position of power. This relationship, like the post-feudalism landlord-tenant relationship described by Gibbard et al (1999), is underpinned by the balance of power residing with the land-owner, who is the capitalrich partner, in comparison with the potential new entrant who has limited resources.…”

“…Ravenscroft (1999) similarly situates share farming, contract farming and partnerships in a 'post-feudal' stage, as distinct from feudal (where land owners are dominant) and neo-feudal (characterised by formal tenancies and associated with FATs). The post-feudal stage in England and Wales (exemplified by the era following the 1995 Agricultural Tenancies Act and the introduction of Farm Business Tenancies -FBTs) is described as driven by a free market orthodoxy, with arrangements brought about through negotiation rather than being pre-determined under law (Gibbard et al, 1999). This has introduced flexibility in tenure arrangements which extends beyond leasing, that is described as open, unregulated and short term, allowing 'both parties the maximum freedom to exploit shortterm market opportunities' (Gibbard et al, 1999, p. 271).…”

“…Whilst market conditions can explain this to some extent, with lack of capital being a considerable drawback for many young entrants (Gibbard et al, 1999), it would appear that other forces are at play. Insights from the succession literature suggest that reluctance to engage in a JV may stem from deep rooted concerns about personal and working incompatibilities between new entrants and the owner occupier due to differing motivations and goals.…”

“…Whitehead et al, (2002) found that fewer than 10 per cent of FBTs were let to new entrants. Gibbard et al (1999) also argue that, whilst the 1995 Act has provided a solution to farm expansion for existing farmers, it has reduced the flexibility and future possibilities for new entrants. Thus it would appear that policy interventions to date, such as retirement support and FBTs, have offered limited scope to address the entry-exit issue.…”

“…It is likely, however, that proposals for such interventions will be contested; the case to allow market forces to prevail is still relevant, as is the question of whether such arrangements would represent value for money (ADAS et al 2004). It is also questionable whether such intervention can work in a situation where the balance of power rests so heavily with those rich in capital (Gibbard et al, 1999). Equally the farming industry itself might question the need to intervene and stifle existing farmers' current opportunities for innovative and flexible strategies for land use and management.…”