The Populist Radical Right and European Integration: A Comparative Analysis of Party–Voter Links

Gómez-Reino, Margarita; Llamazares, Iván

doi:10.1080/01402382.2013.783354

Cited by 43 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…de Vries and Edwards, 2009). PRR parties, nevertheless, are typically the strongest opponents of the EU in national party systems (Gómez-Reino and Llamazares, 2013). Moreover, during the past decades there has been an increase of right-wing Euroscepticism, that is, opposition against the EU for reasons related to national interests, sovereignty, and identity (van Elsas and van der Brug, 2015).…”

Section: The Prr and European Integrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Eager to leave? Populist radical right parties’ responses to the UK’s Brexit vote

Kessel

Chelotti

Drake

et al. 2020

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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Populist radical right parties are naturally Eurosceptic. Many responded positively to the British referendum vote to leave the European Union; various observers even spoke of a potential populist radical right-instigated ‘domino effect’. We ask whether this Brexit-enthusiasm prevailed in the proximate aftermath of the UK referendum, by means of a comparative analysis of populist radical right parties’ national election campaigns in the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Italy. The analysis considers whether the UK referendum result served as an external stimulus for populist radical right parties to harden their Euroscepticism and politicise the issue of European integration. The results show that this has, generally speaking, not been the case, and that Brexit has also not stimulated or amplified calls for leaving the European Union. Relating our findings to literature on the politicisation of European integration and strategic party behaviour, we argue that populist radical right parties had few incentives to act differently given the uninviting political opportunity structure.

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Section: The Prr and European Integrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Eager to leave? Populist radical right parties’ responses to the UK’s Brexit vote

Kessel

Chelotti

Drake

et al. 2020

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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“…Explanations of PRR parties' electoral fortunes commonly include both demand and supplyside factors, that is, on the one hand, the preferences expressed by voters and, on the other hand, the way in which political parties respond to those expectations and concerns (Mudde, 2007;Arzheimer, 2009;Gómez-Reino and Llamazares, 2013). As Mudde (2007) points out: "a demand for populist radical right politics does not necessarily result in its emergence and success at the party system level.…”

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confidence: 99%

Towards the median economic crisis voter? The new leftist economic agenda of the Front National in France

Ivaldi

2015

Fr Polit

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International audienceThe Front National (FN) has made an impressive come back into France’s electoral politics since 2012. Adopting a supply-side approach, this article places the electoral rejuvenation of the FN in the context of the global crisis and looks at how the party has adapted programmatically to socio-economic demands emerging from this context. On the basis of manifesto data analysis, we find that despite having recently broadened its economic programme, the FN maintains a niche status in the party system. Our findings show, however, that the party has significantly shifted its economic platform, moving from a predominantly right-wing to a left-wing location since the mid-1980s. This move is characterized by an increase in egalitarian and nationalist economic policies, espousing also a populist framework. The reconfiguration of the FN suggests that the party may have moved to a pivotal position in recent years by converging around the economic preferences of the median voter. We discuss the role of internal and external factors in explaining the economic policy shift by the FN, and consider possible implications of our findings for understanding current populist radical right electoral dynamics in Europe

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“…On the other hand, we have to take into account that organisational fields are patterned along cleavages, conflicts and oppositions, too, which are of particular importance to better understand the contentiousness of European solidarity. In fact, in many issue fields and policy domains at national and EU level, we see the emergence of populist, nationalist and xenophobic groups, political parties and movements (Kriesi, 2012;Wodak et al, 2013;Gómez-Reino and Llamazares, 2013), which in many instances oppose attempts to mobilise and institutionalise measures of European solidarity. Here, we refer back to our argument that solidarity is highly political in the sense of implying (competing) notions of (imagined) groups or communities (e.g., regional, national, European) with opposing memberships, missions and ideas.…”

Section: Analytical and Explanatory Matters: Multi-layered Solidaritymentioning

confidence: 99%

European solidarity: an introduction to a multifaceted phenomenon

Lahusen¹

2020

Citizens’ Solidarity in Europe

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Solidarity has become a strongly debated issue within the European Union. Ongoing conflicts between member states about financial solidarity with states affected severely by the economic crisis of 2008 and about fair burden-sharing with regard to the high numbers of refugees show the difficulties of living up to the standard of solidarity which the EU lists in its treaties as one of its guiding principles. At the same time, the debate unveils that solidarity is highly contested. The reservations of EU member states to share the burdens regarding the costs of the economic crisis and the migration inflow can be criticised as a lack of interstate solidarity and a prioritisation of national interests; they also evidence a more fundamental difficulty in agreeing on adequate public policies and coordinated problem-solving strategies. Governments are sensitive to nationalist and populist mobilisations and parties, whose electoral successes seem to limit the readiness of member states to engage beyond what might be conceived of as an instrumental and utilitarian solidarity of 'quid pro quo'. More than that, nationalist and populist parties contest the idea of European solidarity precisely in the name of national solidarity, and the need to defend national communities against outside interventions. Hence, controversies about solidarity prevail within the public sphere. These debates, however, have paid more attention to interstate solidarity, thus marginalising another topic that is much less discussed and researched: European social or civic solidarity. In fact, even though we might expect that both dimensions are interrelated, it is necessary to differentiate between solidarity among states and solidarity between European citizens, between the 'intergovernmental' and 'transnational' dimensions of solidarity, and between the 'vertical' support of interstate solidarity by citizens and the 'horizontal' engagement of citizens in cross-border relations of support and help (Apostoli, 2012: 4). Very little is known about the amount of transnational solidarity and the effects of

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The Populist Radical Right and European Integration: A Comparative Analysis of Party–Voter Links

Cited by 43 publications

References 33 publications

Eager to leave? Populist radical right parties’ responses to the UK’s Brexit vote

Eager to leave? Populist radical right parties’ responses to the UK’s Brexit vote

Towards the median economic crisis voter? The new leftist economic agenda of the Front National in France

European solidarity: an introduction to a multifaceted phenomenon

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