The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population

Abstract

This paper considers the trade-off between unanimity and anonymity in collective decision-making with an infinite population. This efficiency-equity trade-off is a fundamental difficulty in making a normative judgment in a conflict between generations. In particular, it is known that this trade-off is quite sensitive in the formulation of unanimity axioms. In this study, we consider the trade-off in a preference-aggregation framework instead of the standard utility-aggregation framework. We show that there exists a social welfare function that satisfies I-strong Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and finite anonymity. This contrasts with an impossibility result in the standard utility-aggregation framework, and this means that the trade-off is also sensitive for background frameworks of aggregations.

Quasi-Ultrafilter on the Connectivity System: Its Relationship to Branch-Decomposition

“…While the properties of a Quasi-Ultrafilter closely resemble those of an ultrafilter, they diverge in property (QB1). The significance of the Quasi-Ultrafilter is evident, given its mention in various related studies (e.g., [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]25]).…”