The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem

Abstract

In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety remains the default view in much of the debate concerning normative reasons for belief. Strict versions of evidentialism are inconsistent with the view that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief.

Pragmatic Reasons for Belief

“…⁵³ A version of this argument appears in Reisner (2009). Important related discussions appear in Booth (2014aBooth ( & 2014b and Reisner (2008Reisner ( & 2015, and Reisner and Van Weelden (2015).…”

“…²¹ '[W]hat we take to be evidence...' is not meant to imply that we must conceptualise particular considerations as evidence. ²² For a detailed discussion of this problem, see Reisner (2009). time that we psychologically can believe is what we do believe, given a particular set of conditions.…”

“…Important related discussions appear in Booth (2014aBooth ( & 2014b and Reisner (2008Reisner ( & 2015, and Reisner and Van Weelden (2015). ⁵⁴ See Danielsson and Olson (2007) and Reisner (2009) for the 'eyes on the prize' argument in favour of treating the incentives as direct pragmatic reasons for belief. ⁵⁵ John Skorupski has articulated this view in some detail in Skorupski (2011).…”

Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against

“…Adding or subtracting a belief on the le hand side of the conditional ³⁰ Reisner (2009 and. We need not consider other similar rational requirements.…”

Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity

“…¹⁴ This example assumes that state-given reasons cannot be reduced to object-given reasons, but examples can be generated without this assumption. For a defense of the non-reducibility of state-given reasons, see Reisner (2009). Parfit (2001) and Skorupski (2011), defend the reducibility of state-given reasons to object-given reasons.…”