2022
DOI: 10.1017/9781108694308
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The Post-Partisans

Abstract: Where party identification is in decay or in flux, alternative political identifications have gained centrality. In this Element, the author develops a typology of post-partisan political identities: alternative ways in which rejection of or the absence of partisan politics are defining political identifiers or non-identifiers. Based on original evidence collected through opinion polls in different Latin American countries, as well as applying an innovative measurement, the author shows the respective magnitud… Show more

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Cited by 36 publications
(12 citation statements)
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References 78 publications
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“…Indeed, the relative importance of negative partisanship as an independent factor is likely to vary across contexts. Polities where positive partisan ties are weak may be particularly susceptible to a mostly 'negative' electorate, as in several Latin American countries (Meléndez 2022). Comparative studies on mass partisanship (e.g.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Indeed, the relative importance of negative partisanship as an independent factor is likely to vary across contexts. Polities where positive partisan ties are weak may be particularly susceptible to a mostly 'negative' electorate, as in several Latin American countries (Meléndez 2022). Comparative studies on mass partisanship (e.g.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Meléndez and Kaltwasser (2021), for instance, note the high rates of negative partisanship in Western Europe, far exceeding rates of positive partisan identification. Works on weakly institutionalised party systems in Eastern Europe (Rose and Mishler 1998) and Latin America (Meléndez 2022) have also highlighted that individuals may oppose a particular party without feeling attached to any, especially in contexts of an electorally dominant party. These works provided important evidence for the claim that dislike of a particular party does not necessarily entail preference for one, or, in other words, that negative partisanship is an independent concept from positive partisanship.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We do not deny the fact that Guatemala's democratic political culture is weak (especially compared to others in the region), but it has enough resistance to support anti-corruption processes and back democratic projects in specific critical junctures. Even anti-establishment electoral movements that use to represent authoritarian or illiberal agendas in other countries of the region (Meléndez, 2022), in Guatemala can embody democratic hopes, like the case of Movimiento Semilla.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Samuels and Zucco (2018) provide powerful evidence of such forms of "negative partisanship" in their analysis of polarizing opposition to the Workers' Party (PT) in Brazil. Meléndez (2022) suggests that polarizing negative affect may also form in opposition to a trans-partisan political elite or establishment, often derided as a casta política (political caste) in populist rhetoric. In short, whereas ideological polarization refers to the spatial distance in policy preferences between parties or voters (e.g., Roberts 2022), affective polarization tries to capture the degree of mutual animosity between them-to the point where one group may not recognize the other as legitimate actors in the democratic arena (e.g., McCoy and Rahman 2016).…”
Section: What Do We Mean By Polarization-and How Should We Measure It...mentioning
confidence: 99%