The poverty of embodied cognition

Abstract

In recent years, there has been rapidly growing interest in Embodied Cognition, a multifaceted theoretical proposition that (1) cognitive processes are influenced by the body, (2) cognition exists in the service of action, (3) cognition is situated in the environment, and (4) cognition may occur without internal representations. Many proponents view embodied cognition as the next great paradigm shift for cognitive science. In this article, we critically examine the core ideas from embodied cognition, taking a “thought exercise” approach. We first note that the basic principles from embodiment theory are either unacceptably vague (e.g., the premise that perception is influenced by the body) or they offer nothing new (e.g., cognition evolved to optimize survival, emotions affect cognition, perception-action couplings are important). We next suggest that, for the vast majority of classic findings in cognitive science, embodied cognition offers no scientifically valuable insight. In most cases, the theory has no logical connections to the phenomena, other than some trivially true ideas. Beyond classic laboratory findings, embodiment theory is also unable to adequately address the basic experiences of cognitive life.

Arguments about the nature of concepts: Symbols, embodiment, and beyond

“…As will be discussed below, Barsalou (this issue; see also Barsalou, 1999; 2008a) has argued that the critical issue is one of ‘neural reuse’—i.e., the idea that the same neural regions that are involved in perception and action are involved in conceptual processing. Barsalou (1999; 2008a) was diligent in his framing of the theory to argue how key phenomena of human conceptual processing (e.g., compositionality, productivity) could arise from the quasi-symbolic operation of perceptual symbols (for other proposals within the embodied or grounded framework see Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Kiefer and Pulvermüller, 2012; Pulvermüller, 2005; 2013; Prinz, 2002; Glenberg, 2015a; b; Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan, 2004; Martin et al, 2000; for broader discussion, see Chatterjee, 2010; Machery, 2007; Dove, 2009; Mahon, 2015a; b; c; Goldinger et al, this issue; Hickok, 2014). …”

Situatedness and Embodiment of Computational Systems

“…Researchers have to determine how cognitive phenomena are constituted by internal processes and components of (neuro) cognitive mechanisms if the explanation is supposed to be causal and mechanistic. Unless the practitioners of embodied and embedded cognition can show that they can explain all individual differences in performance by appealing to the external environment and bodily structures, their reliance on environmental interaction as the only explanatory factor will count as mere ideology, whose poverty is already heavily criticized [8]. The mechanistic story, instead of recommending symbolic models of cognition, stresses that approaches to cognition must be flexible and pluralistic to be empirically valid.…”

“…In this sense, the theory is a first approximation, which is to be refined by introduction of the sensory and other biological limits as additional constraints upon behavior. [19] (p. 866) Here Newell and Simon claim something that seems to correspond to the recent survey of results obtained under the broad umbrella of the embodied cognition: even if embodied experimental designs lead to interesting discoveries, the embodied cognition has little or no role in explaining a number of cognitive processes [8]. It is precisely because in the weak sense, it is trivial that off-line cognition is body-based: people are not made of supernatural substance, after all; and in a strong sense, it is simply false: it is not only the body that is crucial in explaining most individual differences in solving cryptarithmetic tasks.…”

“…Is theory in cognitive science not up-to-date? Or maybe, the role of embodiment is actually overhyped, as some argue [8].…”

Embodied Music Cognition: Trouble Ahead, Trouble Behind

“…This hypothesis, while suitable for accommodating different research methods used in empirical musicology (Godøy and Leman, 2010), may be regarded as inherently rather abstract. In the light of recent critical accounts on the foundations of embodied approaches to cognition as such (e.g., Goldinger et al, 2016, point out that premises like “perception is influenced by the body” are unacceptably vague), EMC hypothesis begs for further specification. Anticipating it, Leman and Maes (2014) suggested that the process of disambiguating what EMC hypothesis stands for, may take two forms.…”