The power of activism

Spar, Debora L.; Mure, Lane T. La

doi:10.4324/9780203891568.ch7

Cited by 5 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Yet, we find that direct targeting by advocacy groups against firms did not lead firms to conform to NGOs' programmatic goals. The results of our case studies suggest that NGO tactics that further aggravated existing adversarial relationships with firms led the targeted actors to "resist" rather than to "acquiesce" (Spar and La Mure, 2003). Rather than seeking to pacify NGO criticism by obtaining FSC certification as their European counterparts had done, U.S.-based firms sought to sidestep that criticism by moving to SFI third-party certification.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 84%

“…They have employed radio, television and newspaper ads to condemn practices of particular firms, organized boycotts, sit-ins, customer confrontations; and employed face-to-face challenges in the form of blockades, protests, banner-hangs, and so on. These campaigns have been conducted by transnational activist groups in a variety of domestic political environments, and often involve transnational market-mobilization tactics in "socially conscious" markets such as Europe, Canada, and the U.S. (Spar and La Mure, 2003;Klein, 1999). As Zadek writes: "Show-stopping campaigns like those against Nike, Monsanto and Shell … have all basically had this relationship in mind: 'Hit them till it hurts, and then they will change for the better.'…”

Section: Ngo Political Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Instead of pursuing individual actions, forestry firms decided to collectively counter NGOs by establishing and supporting an industry-sponsored regime (SFI) that provided them with more autonomy in rule setting, monitoring, and enforcement. In our cases, we explore not a binary choice of "acquiescing" or "resisting" (Spar and La Mure, 2003), but a third route in which businesses responded strategically to NGO demands in order to maintain control over their institutional environment. While the business-sponsored SFI regime-like the NGO-sponsored FSC-involved the ratcheting-up of forest management standards, it remained under the direct control of industry interests.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Direct Targeting as an NGO Political Strategy: Examining Private Authority Regimes in the Forestry Sector

Sasser¹,

et al. 2006

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In recent years, International Political Economy literature on “politics beyond state” has emphasized the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in broader policy processes, both national and international. In addition to their impact on states, NGOs influence the policies of non-state actors such as firms via public and private politics. Dissatisfied with the progress firms have made in response to public regulation, NGOs have sponsored private authority regimes in several issue areas and pushed firms to participate in them. Across the world, the contest between NGOs and firms has provoked substantial behavioral and programmatic change'including widespread participation in these private authority regimes'among firms seeking to escape NGO pressures. Using firm-level data, this paper examines why direct targeting has not led firms in the U.S. forest products sector to participate in an NGO-sponsored private authority regime, the Forest Stewardship Council. This global regime has been adopted widely in Europe, but U.S.-based forestry firms have tended to favor a domestic industry-sponsored regime, the Sustainable Forestry Initiative. Our analysis suggests that the desire of firms to maintain control over their institutional environment in light of hostile relations with NGOs has led US-based firms to favor the Sustainable Forestry Initiative.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 84%

Section: Ngo Political Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Direct Targeting as an NGO Political Strategy: Examining Private Authority Regimes in the Forestry Sector

Sasser¹,

et al. 2006

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“…As required by the second condition, a labor-related California effect requires that workers' rights activists in importing states are sufficiently powerful to motivate importing firms to take notice of the practices of their subsidiaries and subcontractors. These interest groups must have the incentive to spend valuable political capital pressuring consumers or corporations to limit imports from states with poor labor practices, or at least to “name and shame” companies that overlook this issue in their supply chains (Baron 2003; Spar and LaMure 2003). Human and labor rights activists and NGOs have an obvious interest in promoting higher labor standards abroad, but so too do other domestic interest groups such as labor unions that seek to protect domestic manufacturing industries from lower-cost imports.…”

Section: The California Effect In Labor Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most corporations tend to source a large percentage of their inputs, components, and, in some cases, even finished products, from overseas suppliers. Alongside, multinational corporations have come under pressure from a variety of directions—such as shareholders, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and consumers—to ensure ethical conduct and practices within their supply chains (Becker and Sklar 1999; Prakash and Potoski 2007; Spar and LaMure 2003). For many firms, the threat of political action by activist groups in importing countries concerned about buying goods from countries that suppress labor rights, the ensuing media scrutiny, and the possibility of consumer backlash create strong incentives to pay attention to labor issues abroad.…”

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confidence: 99%

Trade-based Diffusion of Labor Rights: A Panel Study, 1986–2002

2009

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This article investigates the nature of the linkages between trade and labor rights in developing countries. Specifically, we hypothesize that a “California effect” serves to transmit superior labor standards from importing to exporting countries, in a manner similar to the transmission of environmental standards. We maintain that, all else being equal, the labor standards of a given country are influenced not by its overall level of trade openness, but by the labor standards of its trading partners. We evaluate our hypothesis using a panel of 90 developing countries over the period 1986–2002, and we separately examine the extent to which the labor laws and the actual labor practices of the countries are influenced by those of their export destinations. We find that strong legal protections of collective labor rights in a country's export destinations are associated with more stringent labor laws in the exporting country. This California effect finding is, however, weaker in the context of labor rights practices, highlighting the importance of distinguishing between formal legislation and actual implementation of labor rights.

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Animal Advocacy and the “Good Cop‐Bad Cop” Radical Flanking of Laboratory Research

Evans

2022

Sociological Inquiry

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This research explores the concurrent effects of radical and reformist approaches to animal advocacy on how animal welfare is institutionalized in laboratory research. The long-term outcomes of militant animal rights activism are not adequately explained by the two current radical flank effect models: a positive effect where militancy helps moderates, and a negative effect where militancy compromises the movement as a whole. Interviews and participant observation were used to identify a third model-good copbad cop radical flanking-that more accurately captures how a longstanding radical fringe of activism affects the institutionalization of animal advocates' demands. Contrary to existing models that describe immediate radical flank effects, a good cop-bad cop model helps explain the long-term effects of militancy and reformism on institutional practices, where activists' seemingly opposing efforts are, in fact, mutually reinforcing. I think (science) has benefited because the movement has alerted the public that animals have feelings. I don't remember ever being told that animals have feelings. "Albert," Scientist who started using animals for laboratory research in the early 1960s.

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The power of activism

Cited by 5 publications

References 17 publications

Direct Targeting as an NGO Political Strategy: Examining Private Authority Regimes in the Forestry Sector

Direct Targeting as an NGO Political Strategy: Examining Private Authority Regimes in the Forestry Sector

Trade-based Diffusion of Labor Rights: A Panel Study, 1986–2002

Animal Advocacy and the “Good Cop‐Bad Cop” Radical Flanking of Laboratory Research

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