The Power of Empty Promises

Abstract

In authoritarian regimes, seemingly liberal reforms are often poorly implemented in practice. However, this study argues that even weak quasi-democratic institutions can offer resources to political activists. Formal institutions of participation offer politically anodyne frames for activism, allowing activists to distance themselves from political taboos. Weak institutions also allow activists to engineer institutional failures that in turn fuel legal and media-based campaigns. Evidence comes from the effects of China’s 2008 Open Government Information reform. A national field audit finds that local governments satisfy just 14% of citizen requests for basic information. Yet case studies show how Chinese activists exploited the same institution to extract concessions from government agencies and pursue policy change in disparate issue areas. These findings highlight the importance of looking beyond policy implementation to understand the effects of authoritarian institutions on political accountability.

How Soft Propaganda Persuades

“…However, nationalist propaganda does not appear to influence citizens' perception of government performance or their willingness to protest against their government. Therefore, our study suggests that authoritarian control is maintained through a more complex landscape of propaganda, responsive institutions (e.g., Chen et al, 2016;Distelhorst & Hou, 2017;Distelhorst, 2017;Distelhorst &Fu, 2019), andrepression (e.g., Fu, 2018;Fu & Distelhorst, 2018;Mattingly, 2020;Svolik, 2012), with nationalist propaganda playing a supportive role.…”

Outsourcing authoritarian governance: The privatization of mayors’ hotlines in China

“…Previous literature has pointed out that, compared with democratic counterparts, without elective accountability, institutions of government responsiveness usually operate as tools for authoritarian control: they operate as the institutional arrangements shaping citizen participation and help resolve social conflict, repress domestic dissent, collect public information, and maintain public trust. 22 This article aims to explore to what extent the outsourcing mode and engagement of third parties would impact the implementation of the mayor's hotline system and the realization of its complex function.…”

Institutions, interests, and policy support: Experimental evidence from China

“…Political representation increasingly appears in developing countries. Despite formal representative institutions like elections, developing countries increasingly introduce vital components of political representation like constituency services to deal with problems raised by citizens or to respond to their demands (Chen et al, 2016; Distelhorst, 2017; Meng et al, 2017). More than merely “window dressing,” these institutions enable authoritarian rulers to identify public discontent and mitigate social grievances before an explosion; yet whether and how components of political representation shape policy support in developing countries remain unknown.…”

“…In particular, despite imperfections in its economic and political system, China has been the most rapidly growing country for more than three decades (Acemoglu et al, 2012), has managed to achieve economic development under comparatively weak political institutions (Oi, 1999; Tsai, 2011), and becomes more institutionalized since 1978 (Gehlbach & Keefer, 2011). Local governments in China exhibit a high level of responsiveness to local demands (Distelhorst, 2017). China may provide a unique case for us to understand sources of policy support.…”