The Power of Mediation in an Extended El Farol Game

Mitsche, Dieter; Saad, George; Saia, Jared

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_5

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…is simple simulation has found applications in a wide array of disciplines including disciplines a widely diverse as statistical mechanics [13], computer networking [14], shared resource optimization [15], 3 rd party mediation [16], social networking [17], dynamic learning processes [18,19], and selforganized networks [20]. All of these applications are possible because at the core of the El Farol model is a stable, dynamic system that approaches equilibrium but never converges on any solution.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Simulating Systems Thinking under Bounded Rationality

2020

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Brian Arthur’s El Farol bar model of bounded rationality provides a simple computer model of decision making in a complex, dynamic, and self-organized environment. Can systems thinking provide a viable alternative strategy to traditional methods for dealing with these types of problems? Nine different agents, designed from both traditional and systems perspectives, compete in fifteen variants of the El Farol environment and their performance in 4 categories—Winner, Top Performers, Competitive, and Vulnerable—is compared. We show that systems thinking is a competitive strategy that is, at least, on par with traditional strategies and may be less vulnerable to elimination or ruin. However, there are two consequential elements that emerge. First, all strategies have some environments where they succeed and others where they fail. Second, as the population of practitioners adopts these adaptive, systems-based strategies, the environment exhibits new behaviors with a new set of unintended consequences.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Simulating Systems Thinking under Bounded Rationality

2020

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“…Being there is fun if there is some crowd, but starts getting unpleasant if the crowd is excessive. More recently it has been studied as a nonatomic game by Mitsche et al (2013).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…It is immediate to see that △(WE(Γ)) ⊆ CWE(Γ) ⊆ CCWE(Γ). The next example from Mitsche et al (2013) illustrates the difference between CWE and WE. In the example, there exists a CWE in which the expected social cost is strictly smaller than in any WE, where the social cost of is defined as…”

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confidence: 99%

Information Design in Large Games

Koessler¹,

Scarsini²,

Tomala³

2021

Preprint

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A. We define the notion of Bayes correlated Wardrop equilibrium for general nonatomic games with anonymous players and incomplete information. Bayes correlated Wardrop equilibria describe the set of equilibrium outcomes when a mediator, such as a traffic information system, provides information to the players. We relate this notion to Bayes Wardrop equilibrium. Then, we provide conditions-existence of a convex potential and complete information-under which mediation does not improve equilibrium outcomes. We then study full implementation and, finally, information design in anonymous games with a finite set of players, when the number of players tends to infinity.

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Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian Games

Koessler,

Scarsini,

Tomala

2024

Mathematics of OR

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We consider multipopulation Bayesian games with a large number of players. Each player aims at minimizing a cost function that depends on this player’s own action, the distribution of players’ actions in all populations, and an unknown state parameter. We study the nonatomic limit versions of these games and introduce the concept of Bayes correlated Wardrop equilibrium, which extends the concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium to nonatomic games. We prove that Bayes correlated Wardrop equilibria are limits of action flows induced by Bayes correlated equilibria of the game with a large finite set of small players. For nonatomic games with complete information admitting a convex potential, we prove that the set of correlated and of coarse correlated Wardrop equilibria coincide with the set of probability distributions over Wardrop equilibria and that all equilibrium outcomes have the same costs. We get the following consequences. First, all flow distributions of (coarse) correlated equilibria in convex potential games with finitely many players converge to mixtures of Wardrop equilibria when the weight of each player tends to zero. Second, for any sequence of flows satisfying a no-regret property, its empirical distribution converges to the set of distributions over Wardrop equilibria, and the average cost converges to the unique Wardrop cost. Funding: This work was partially supported by European Cooperation in Science and Technology Action 16228 GAMENET. F. Koessler acknowledges the support of the Agence Nationale de la Recherche [Grant StratCom ANR-19-CE26-0010-01]. M. Scarsini acknowledges the support of the Gruppo Nazionale per l’Analisi Matematica, la Probabilità e le loro Applicazioni project [Grant CUP_E53C22001930001], the Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca Progetti di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale [Grant 2022EKNE5K], and the European Union-Next Generation EU, component M4C2, investment 1.1 (Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca Progetti di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza) [Grant P2022XT8C8]. T. Tomala gratefully acknowledges the support of the HEC foundation and Agence Nationale de la Recherche/Investissements d’Avenir [Grant ANR-11-IDEX-0003/Labex Ecodec/ANR-11-LABX-0047].

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The Power of Mediation in an Extended El Farol Game

Cited by 3 publications

References 26 publications

Simulating Systems Thinking under Bounded Rationality

Simulating Systems Thinking under Bounded Rationality

Information Design in Large Games

Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian Games

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