The power of precision air strikes and social media feeds in the 2012 Israel–Hamas conflict: ‘targeting transparency’

Abstract

This article analyses the evolving uses of social media during wartime through the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) Spokesperson Facebook and Twitter accounts. The conflict between Israel and Hamas-affiliated groups in November 2012 has generated interesting data about social media use by a sovereign power in wartime and the resultant networked discourse. Facebook data is examined for effective patterns of dissemination through both content analysis and discourse analysis. Twitter data is explored through connected concept analysis to map the construction of meaning in social media texts shared by the IDF. The systematic examination of this social media data allows the authors' analysis to comment on the evolving modes, methods and expectations for state public diplomacy, propaganda and transparency during wartime.The above tweet, transmitted across the world, signals a new confluence of propaganda and 'transparency' in the information age. Within hours of a targeted killing by air strike being carried out, Israel, Hamas and the rest of the world were shown the details and were discussing the consequences. However, this provocative tweet was only one piece of the social media content that constituted Israel's war narrative, and was not indicative of the majority of Israel's social media messaging during the 2012 Israel-Hamas conflict. This article aims to examine the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) Spokesperson social media output for evolving facets of power, legitimacy and representation in a networked terrain. It argues that the spread of information shared by states in social media in times of war is impacted by complex dynamics that include new

Organizational propaganda on the Internet: A systematic review

“…One of the studies also relates to a political context: Ciovacco’s (2009) piece on Al-Qaeda’s media strategy took a perspective centered on the connection to US politics, although religious motives such as the call to jihad cannot be separated from a group like Al-Qaeda. Eight studies are placed within the political arena, such as those concerning the propaganda of political institutions in Spain (Sande, 2016) or Heemsbergen and Lindgren’s (2014) paper on the Israeli Army’s social media feeds during wartime. Five studies fit into the category of civil society, such as extreme right-wing organizations, for instance, of the white supremacist movement (Brown, 2009), or nonprofit organizations’ social media strategies (Auger, 2013).…”

“…Rothenberger (2012) studied different terrorist groups’ use of the Internet and thus coded tweets, audio and video material, pictures, and sounds. Heemsbergen and Lindgren (2014) also looked at infographics published on Facebook. None of the articles investigated speeches, symbols, music, or apps.…”

“…These two goals came along in eight cases with the aim to build legitimacy and preserve the status quo. Heemsbergen and Lindgren (2014), for instance, showed how the spokesperson of the Israeli army aimed to build legitimacy for the military strikes during the 2012 Gaza conflict, evoke an impression of the Israeli people being under threat by Hamas, and actively share the information on the war. Two studies revealed that digital organizational propaganda was employed to generate support among followers for the terrorist actions of the so-called Islamic State (Cooley et al, 2016; Hatton and Nielsen, 2016).…”

Rich variety of DA approaches applied in social media research: A systematic scoping review

“…In this case, everyday people's comments and reactions were still in the limelight of the research. Heemsbergen and Lindgren (2014), on the other hand, analysed the Israel Defense Forces' Spokesperson's social media accounts.…”

Frames of Death: Media Audience Framing of a Lethal Drone Strike

“…The Iraq war is the first example where both soldiers and the army publish videos on YouTube from an ongoing war (Andén-Papadopoulos, 2009). 4 What perhaps is different from other previously studied types of media outlets, such as war propaganda in news reporting (Boltanski, 1999;Chouliaraki, 2006;Hiebert, 2003;Sontag 2003), is that YouTube allows people to interact and comment in the comment field adjacent to the video clip (see also Heemsbergen & Lindgren, 2014). Seemingly anonymous participants express themselves in their own localized media consumption, which becomes part of a potentially global communication about the content of video clips.…”