The Power of the Truth Bias: False Information Affects Memory and Judgment Even in the Absence of Distraction

Pantazi, Myrto; Kissine, Mikhaïl; Klein, Olivier

doi:10.1521/soco.2018.36.2.167

Cited by 29 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 55 publications

(90 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Other studies demonstrated that mere exposure to CTs tends to increase their endorsement (Douglas and Sutton, 2008 ; Jolley and Douglas, 2014 ; van der Linden, 2015 ). Such works highlight the strength and persistence of misinformation, and are consistent with Gilbert's ( 1991 ) theory according to which people are prone to believe any information they encounter (see also, Kissine and Klein, 2014 ; Pantazi et al, 2018 ). To our knowledge, however, the impact of conspiracy fiction on conspiracy beliefs has not been investigated.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 68%

“These Are Just Stories, Mulder”: Exposure to Conspiracist Fiction Does Not Produce Narrative Persuasion

2018

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Narrative persuasion, i.e., the impact of narratives on beliefs, behaviors and attitudes, and the mechanisms underpinning endorsement of conspiracy theories have both drawn substantial attention from social scientists. Yet, to date, these two fields have evolved separately, and to our knowledge no study has empirically examined the impact of conspiracy narratives on real-world conspiracy beliefs. In a first study, we exposed a group of participants (n = 37) to an X-Files episode before asking them to fill in a questionnaire related to their narrative experience and conspiracy beliefs. A control group (n = 41) had to answer the conspiracy beliefs items before watching the episode. Based on past findings of both the aforementioned fields of research, we hypothesized that the experimental group would show greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs, an effect expected to be mediated by identification to the episodes' characters. We furthermore hypothesized that identification would be associated with cognitive elaboration of the topics developed in the narrative. The first two hypotheses were disproved since no narrative persuasion effect was observed. In a second study, we sought to replicate these results in a larger sample (n = 166). No persuasive effect was found in the new data and a Bayesian meta-analysis of the two studies strongly supports the absence of a positive effect of exposure to narrative material on endorsement of conspiracy theories. In both studies, a significant relation between conspiracy mentality and enjoyment was observed. In the second study, this relation was fully mediated by two dimensions of perceived realism, i.e., plausibility and narrative consistency. We discuss our results, based on theoretical models of narrative persuasion and compare our studies with previous narrative persuasion studies. Implications of these results for future research are also discussed.

show abstract

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 68%

“These Are Just Stories, Mulder”: Exposure to Conspiracist Fiction Does Not Produce Narrative Persuasion

2018

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…During the creation of the DJT we sought to reduce measurement error relative to other false information paradigms as the instrument was intended for use in smaller samples (i.e., in limited neuropsychological and neuropsychiatric populations). The critical difference in veridical errors (FasT vs. TasF) during narrative-based false information paradigms tend to produce medium to large effect sizes (d = .52-.77) under the condition of full attention (Chen, 2002;Chen & Blanchard-Fields, 2000;Pantazi et al, 2018). Given Chen's (2002) original design, an alpha level of .05, and an effect size of .77, replication of these two measurements with .80 power yielded an estimate of 12 participants (Faul et al, 2007).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Nadarevic and Erdfleder (2013, p. 179) state, "if people store 'false' tags only, as predicted by the Spinozan model, good source memory in the precue condition should be limited to the false statements of Paul." Because there is an additional step of correct false tag identification following item recognition (relative to true identification), belief-default models actually predict the opposite conclusion: even without distraction/cognitive load there should be a slight advantage for correctly remembering true information (TasT responses) compared to correctly remembering false information (FasF, see also Pantazi et al, 2018).…”

Section: Evidence Against Belief-default Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Prima facie, this outcome would provide evidence for the Cartesian model as it argues for two separate and sequential cognitive states for correctly identifying both true and false propositions. However, narrative-based false information paradigms that present an "imbalance" between explicitly-labeled true and explicitly-labeled false propositions (during the learning phase) tend to produce greater differences between the critical response rates without distraction/cognitive load (Table 2, Chen, 2002;Chen & Blanchard-Fields, 2000;Gilbert et al, 1993;Pantazi et al, 2018). Narrative-based false information paradigms may obscure learning phase base-rate information that is more easily tallied during list-based false information paradigms, as FasT error rates tend to be increased (Pantazi et al, 2018).…”

Section: Evidence Against Belief-default Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Second-guessing of Spinoza: Psychophysiological and behavioral evidence that believing is default during proposition comprehension

Erik¹,

Khan²,

Jonason³

et al. 2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The belief-default model contends that believing is inexorable during comprehension, and falsification is a subsequent, secondary process. By contrast, the Cartesian belief-fixation model argues that naïve propositions may be mentally represented without a truth or falsity stance. In the present research, data from four studies help adjudicate belief-fixation models, favoring the belief-default model: Studies 1-3 show that newly represented propositions are initially believed as the consequences of the truth from a naïve represented proposition will automatically activate contradictory mental information even when this processing impairs task performance (a “false” false alarm belief bias). Naïve propositions cannot be “merely” represented (without a truth stance) during comprehension. Studies 3 and 4 reveal unique electrodermal activity signals corresponding to propositions considered to be either true or false. We argue that the observed autonomic reactivity constitutes the source of two different epistemic emotions associated with the perceived outcomes of a memory search (i.e., “aha” and wrongness, respectively). To account for the psychophysiological results, we hypothesize that the epistemic emotion of familiarity is substantiated by an “aha” emotion which signals the recovery of represented propositions considered true during mnemonic processing. In addition, we show that anti-belief-default conclusions from recent investigations using multinomial processing tree modeling are tenuous as they depend on the type of false information paradigm employed. In sum, the data support the belief-default model and indicate a novel psychophysiological method to distinguish “believed” memory retrieval products from “guessed” responses derived via metacognitive strategies during veridical identification.

show abstract

“…Apparently, people need some time and effort to recognize information as false, and to adjust their evaluations of the criminal accordingly. Pantazi, Klein, and Kissine (2018) have found that even in the absence of such time pressure, people may display such a "truth bias", that is, a tendency to believe information regardless of whether it is true. The idea that not believing but unbelieving requires System 2 thinking corresponds to findings pertaining to the social-cognitive basis of specific belief systems.…”

Section: Social-cognitive Processes Underlying Conspiracy Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social-cognitive processes underlying belief in conspiracy theories

Prooijen¹,

Klein²,

Đorđević³

2020

Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

The Power of the Truth Bias: False Information Affects Memory and Judgment Even in the Absence of Distraction

Cited by 29 publications

References 55 publications

“These Are Just Stories, Mulder”: Exposure to Conspiracist Fiction Does Not Produce Narrative Persuasion

“These Are Just Stories, Mulder”: Exposure to Conspiracist Fiction Does Not Produce Narrative Persuasion

Second-guessing of Spinoza: Psychophysiological and behavioral evidence that believing is default during proposition comprehension

Social-cognitive processes underlying belief in conspiracy theories

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About