This paper establishes model-theoretic properties of $$\texttt {M} \texttt {E} ^{\infty }$$
M
E
∞
, a variation of monadic first-order logic that features the generalised quantifier $$\exists ^\infty $$
∃
∞
(‘there are infinitely many’). We will also prove analogous versions of these results in the simpler setting of monadic first-order logic with and without equality ($$\texttt {M} \texttt {E} $$
M
E
and $$\texttt {M} $$
M
, respectively). For each logic $$\texttt {L} \in \{ \texttt {M} , \texttt {M} \texttt {E} , \texttt {M} \texttt {E} ^{\infty }\}$$
L
∈
{
M
,
M
E
,
M
E
∞
}
we will show the following. We provide syntactically defined fragments of $$\texttt {L} $$
L
characterising four different semantic properties of $$\texttt {L} $$
L
-sentences: (1) being monotone and (2) (Scott) continuous in a given set of monadic predicates; (3) having truth preserved under taking submodels or (4) being truth invariant under taking quotients. In each case, we produce an effectively defined map that translates an arbitrary sentence $$\varphi $$
φ
to a sentence $$\varphi ^\mathsf{p}$$
φ
p
belonging to the corresponding syntactic fragment, with the property that $$\varphi $$
φ
is equivalent to $$\varphi ^\mathsf{p}$$
φ
p
precisely when it has the associated semantic property. As a corollary of our developments, we obtain that the four semantic properties above are decidable for $$\texttt {L} $$
L
-sentences.