The Power of Whispers: A Theory of Rumor, Communication, and Revolution*

Chen, Heng; Lu, Yang; Suen, Wing

doi:10.1111/iere.12149

Cited by 30 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 25 publications

(28 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…On the global games front, Chen et al (2016) assess the impact of circulation of rumours on regime change by studying a coordination game under a global game structure with both public and private signals. Our paper differs from Chen et al (2016) in the following way. In our paper, the informed agent can strategically send private signals to all players.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Ethnic conflicts with informed agents: A cheap talk game with multiple audiences

2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In our paper, the informed agent can strategically send private signals to all players. In contrast, in Chen et al (2016), everyone receives some exogenous private signals about the rumour. Few players have additional information about the state and the ones that do are likely to use this information to their advantage.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Ethnic conflicts with informed agents: A cheap talk game with multiple audiences

2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…L'omniprésence des technologies de communication numérique offre des possibilités sans précédent pour la propagation de rumeurs (par ex. Chen, Lu, Suen, 2016 ;Fisher, 1998 ;Garrett, 2011 ;Harsin, 2006 ;Kwon et al, 2016 ;Solove, 2007 ;Sunstein, 2009). Grâce à la démocratisation de technologies numériques comme Internet et le téléphone portable, les rumeurs se multiplient et peuvent influencer les campagnes électorales (par ex.…”

Section: La Rumeur Et Les Nouveaux Médias à L'âge De L'informationunclassified

Les rumeurs et la téléphonie mobile : participation et résistance dans la Chine contemporaine

Liu

Rochefort²

2017

Participations

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

« La rumeur est une prise de parole spontanée » (KAPFERER, 1990, p. 14). Résumé Cet article présente les caractéristiques et la nature des rumeurs diffusées par téléphone portable en Chine contemporaine. Cette enquête, portant sur six cas d'étude et basée sur une cinquantaine d'entretiens approfondis, étudie comment les rumeurs colportées par téléphone portable sont devenues une forme à part entière de résistance populaire. Le bas coût et la facilité d'accès aux téléphones ont considérablement réduit le seuil de protestation et offert aux gens, en particulier ceux sans grandes compétences technologiques, une opportunité inédite d'organisation, de coordination ou de résistance. La visibilité mutuelle permise par un réseau de téléphones portables ancré dans des relations interpersonnelles (guanxi) augmente la crédibilité de l'information ainsi que le sentiment de sécurité, et encourage ainsi la participation. De plus, la communication mobile synchronique permet l'accumulation des discours de la rumeur, qui devient alors très rapidement résistance. La diffusion de rumeurs par téléphone portable, en tant que nouvelle forme de politique conflictuelle, met en évidence l'opposition à la censure gouvernementale et au contrôle des communications, ainsi que la résistance à l'usage par les autorités des accusations de colporter des rumeurs pour faire taire toute voix divergente. En s'appuyant sur le cas des rumeurs, cette étude tente ainsi d'élargir la compréhension de la participation politique en Chine contemporaine. *** 1 Cet article constitue une version réécrite du chapitre « Mobile Phone Rumors as Nonviolent Resistance » de ma thèse Mobilized by Mobile Media: How Chinese people use mobile phones to change politics and democracy (Université de Copenhague, 2013). L'auteur remercie les coordinatrices du dossier, Émilie Frenkiel et Simeng Wang, pour leurs commentaires et suggestions qui ont été hautement appréciés.

show abstract

“…9 Morris and Shin (1998) develop the global game framework to address issues related to currency crises. The framework has been adapted to model political regime changes (Edmond 2013;Chen, Lu, and Suen forthcoming) and bank runs (Goldstein and Pauzner 2005). The key element of our theory is that people are uncertain about how the world works, but they can learn it from observing equilibrium outcomes in other countries.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Falling Dominoes: A Theory of Rare Events and Crisis Contagion

Chen¹,

Suen²

2016

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Crises, such as revolutions and currency attacks, rarely occur; but when they do they typically arrive in waves. C rises are typically infrequent events but they tend to be contagious, sometimes even among countries or regions that are seemingly unrelated. These two salient features are particularly evident for currency attacks, mass revolutions, and bank runs. In this paper, we offer a theory to explain the link between the rarity of crises and the contagion phenomenon.Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996a) offer systematic empirical evidence that corroborates these features for currency crises. With a panel of quarterly data covering 20 industrial economies from 1959 to 1993, they can only identify a small sample of 77 crises out of 2,800 total observations. 1 They estimate a binary probit model and find robust evidence for contagion: controlling for a wide range of macroeconomic variables, the existence of a currency attack elsewhere raises the probability of an attack on the domestic currency.2 Figure 1, panel A shows the number of currency attacks in each quarter during the operation of European Monetary System (EMS).3 Three distinct clusters of attacks are evident in this figure.1 They compile a speculative pressure index, which is a weighted average of percentage changes in exchange rate, foreign reserve, and interest rate. Currency attacks are identified as quarters in which the index is at least 1 1/2 standard deviations above the sample mean.2 Other empirical evidence and anecdotes for contagion of speculative attacks abound. See, for example, Bordo and Murshid (2001).3 EMS (Stage I) is chosen because it has well defined operating time and member states. Crisis data are obtained from Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996b).

show abstract

The Power of Whispers: A Theory of Rumor, Communication, and Revolution*

Cited by 30 publications

References 25 publications

Ethnic conflicts with informed agents: A cheap talk game with multiple audiences

Ethnic conflicts with informed agents: A cheap talk game with multiple audiences

Les rumeurs et la téléphonie mobile : participation et résistance dans la Chine contemporaine

Falling Dominoes: A Theory of Rare Events and Crisis Contagion

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About