The Powers Metaphysic

Abstract

Systematic metaphysics is defined by its task of solving metaphysical problems through the repeated application of a single, fundamental ontology. The dominant contemporary metaphysic is that of neo-Humeanism, built on a static ontology typified by its rejection of basic causal and modal features. This book offers and develops a radically distinct metaphysic, one that turns the status quo on its head. Starting with a foundational ontology of inherently causal properties known as ‘powers’, a metaphysic is developed that appeals to powers in explanations of causation, persistence, laws, and modality. Powers are properties that have their causal natures internal to them: they are responsible for the effects in the world. A unique account of powers is developed that understands this internal nature in terms of a blueprint of potential interaction types. After the presentation of the powers ontology, it is put to work in offering solutions to broad metaphysical puzzles, some of which take on different forms in light of the new tools that are available. The defence of the ontology comes from the virtues of metaphysic it can be used to develop. Particular attention is paid to the problems of causation and persistence, simultaneously solving them as it casts them in a new light. The resultant powers metaphysic is offered as a systematic alternative to neo-Humeanism.

Non‐Humeantheories of natural necessity

“…According to the orthodox version of Dispositionalism, laws are derived directly from the modal relations that individuate dispositional properties (Bird, 2007). Others hold that laws are generalizations in the best systematization of particular matters of fact, just as the Humean BSA would have it, except that particular matters of fact involve the instantiation of dispositions rather than Humean categorical properties (Demarest, 2017; Kimpton‐Nye, 2017; Williams, 2019). Finally, some dispositionalists hold that we can dispense with talk about laws entirely.…”

“… Proponents include Shoemaker (1980), Swoyer (1982), Cartwright (1999), Heil (2003), Molnar (2003), Mumford (2004), Bird (2007), Chakravartty (2007), Tugby (2013b), Vetter (2015), Demarest (2017), and Williams (2019). …”

Explanatory dispositionalism

“…In this section, I want to argue against fundamental dispositionalism in any variety. For simplicity, and because it is the most common version of the view, I will formulate the view in its combination with property realism (as defended, e.g., in Bird 2007;Williams 2019), but the argument will not depend on that assumption; what it targets is simply the focus on the fundamental. Even so, my argument will not attack the truth of fundamental dispositionalism: for all I say here, fundamental dispositionalism might be true.…”

“…On these views, the properties in question have both qualitative and dispositional aspects. Those two aspects are then either claimed to be two intimately related aspects of the property, two sides of the same metaphorical coin (Martin 1997) and necessarily linked (Williams 2019), or even identical with each other (Heil 2003); or else, it is argued that the property, understood as a quality, still directly gives rise to-grounds, or serves as a truthmaker to-its own causal-modal profile (Jacobs 2011; Tugby 2012; actually, things are a little more complicated with this view, as detailed in the following footnote 12 ).…”

Grounding theories of powers

“…There are also many necessitarians who tend not to use essentialist language but who nonetheless agree that some natural properties are individuated, at least in part, by the powers that they confer (e.g. Cartwright 1989;Chakravartty 2007;Fales 1990;Harré and Madden 1975;Kistler 2002;Marmodoro 2017;Maxwell 1968;McKitrick 2018;Molnar 2003;Mumford 2004;Vetter 2015;Whittle 2008;Williams 2019). Such philosophers therefore count as dispositional essentialists as we are using the term.…”