The practical value of spurious correlations: selective versus manipulative policy

Leuridan, B; Weber, Erik; Dyck, Maarten Van

doi:10.1093/analys/68.4.298

Cited by 9 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…However, see (Leuridan et al [2008]) for a specific type of policy-selective policy-that is based on spurious correlations such as the phenotypic distributions studied in classical genetics.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Structure of Scientific Theories, Explanation, and Unification. A Causal–Structural Account

Leuridan¹

2014

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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What are scientific theories and how should they be represented?In this paper I propose a causal-structural account, according to which scientific theories are to be represented as sets of interrelated causal and credal nets. In contrast with other accounts of scientific theories (such as Sneedian structuralism, Kitcher's unificationist view, and Darden's theory of theoretical components), this leaves room for causality to play a substantial role. As a result, an interesting account of explanation is provided which sheds light on explanatory unification within a causalist framework. The theory of classical genetics is used as a case study.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Structure of Scientific Theories, Explanation, and Unification. A Causal–Structural Account

Leuridan¹

2014

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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“…Finally, it is clear that successful descriptions do not always require causal information (for an argument to the effect that causal-mechanistic information is not always helpful for description, see Reiss 2007), and it has been argued that causal relations are not needed for policy analysis (Leuridan et al 2008).…”

Section: (B)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Models, Simulations, and the Reduction of Complexity

Gähde¹,

Hartmann²,

Wolf³

2013

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Upon which foundation should one build a model for the Universe as a whole?The idea that such a model should exist seems bold itself. Can we really believe that we might be able to construct a physical model for a unique object that we cannot experiment with, that we are part of and of which we can only see a very small section? The goal of this article is to explain that this does indeed seem possible, that mathematical simplicity is used as a guiding principle in this construction, and that the resulting world model is remarkably consistent with a wealth of observations.Let us begin with a detour through the foundation of laws of nature in physics. It is important to realise that laws of nature do not describe nature herself, but human concepts of nature. Otherwise it would not be possible to replace established laws by other, more general ones, as it has happened several times in the history of physics. Theories in physics are based on axioms chosen by physicists, and these axioms can be altered.Newton's axioms underlie classical mechanics. They distinguish four entities; bodies, forces, space and time, and formulate how bodies move in time through space under the influence of forces. Field theory, initiated by Faraday, attaches forces to space and gives force fields their own dynamics. Special Relativity realises that space and time have no independent existence and thereby connects forces, space and time. General Relativity explains how the presence of bodies and energy affects the structure of space-time. Thus, in a general-relativistic field theory, the four initially separate entities of Newtonian physics are all linked together.The dynamics of physical entities, i.e. their change in time, is described by differential equations. They themselves are not postulated, but derived from a more general concept overarching physics, namely that of an extremal principle . The best-known example is perhaps Fermat's principle, which states that light rays connect the source and the receiver in such a way that the light travel time is extremal along them. The extremal principle underlying essentially all of the established theories in physics is the so-called principle of least action , or Hamilton 's principle. The action itself is an abstract quantity that can be constructed under very general rules. It must be independent of any observer's state of motion,

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“…See Leuridan, Weber, and Van Dyck (2008) for the distinction between manipulative policy and selective policy.…”

Section: Pragmatic Laws and Regularitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Mechanisms Really Replace Laws of Nature?

Leuridan¹

2010

Philos. of Sci.

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Today, mechanisms and mechanistic explanation are very popular in philosophy of science and are deemed a welcome alternative to laws of nature and deductive-nomological explanation. Starting from Mitchell's pragmatic notion of laws, I cast doubt on their status as a genuine alternative. I argue that (1) all complex-systems mechanisms ontologically must rely on stable regularities, while (2) the reverse need not hold. Analogously, (3) models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, while (4) such laws themselves need not always refer to underlying mechanisms. Finally, I show that Mitchell's account is more encompassing than the mechanistic account.

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The practical value of spurious correlations: selective versus manipulative policy

Cited by 9 publications

References 2 publications

The Structure of Scientific Theories, Explanation, and Unification. A Causal–Structural Account

The Structure of Scientific Theories, Explanation, and Unification. A Causal–Structural Account

Models, Simulations, and the Reduction of Complexity

Can Mechanisms Really Replace Laws of Nature?

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