The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court

Stack, Kevin M.

doi:10.2307/797288

Cited by 14 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…The idea that a court's decision followed automatically from an impartial application of the law becomes considerably less credible if the judges themselves do not agree that this is the case. As argued by Stack (1996Stack ( : 2240, "The presence of a dissenting Justice demonstrates that behind the word 'Court' in the 'opinion of the Court' sit individual Justices". Vitale, similarly, summarizes this argument against the practice of public dissent as follows: a dissenting opinion explicitly or implicitly calls into question the persuasiveness and authority of the majority judgment.…”

Section: Dissenting Opinions and Legal Authoritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Delayed but not derailed: legislative compliance with European Court of Human Rights judgments

Stiansen

2019

The International Journal of Human Rights

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When embarking on this project, I was warned that writing a PhD dissertation would be a lonely process. My experience has been different. Throughout this project, I have benefited from the guidance, encouragement, and support from a long list of people. I have also been fortunate to be part of two excellent research environments at the University of Oslo, the Department of Political Science and PluriCourts. I also benefitted immensely from spending the spring of 2017 as a visiting researcher at the Department of Government at Georgetown University. First and foremost, I would like to thank my two dissertation advisors, Jon Hovi and Daniel Naurin, who have guided me through this project. Jon has been truly exceptional in his willingness to always take the time to read and offer detailed comments on any draft presented to him. Not only has his comments helped increase the clarity of the arguments presented in this dissertation, but he also deserves much credit for increasing the quality of the prose. Daniel has offered excellent advice both for sharpening the theoretical contributions and for increasing the relevance of the project to a broader judicial politics audience. Daniel also helped expand the empirical scope of the project to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (in addition to the European Court of Human Rights). Erik Voeten has been extraordinarily generous in offering both advice and support. The collaboration with Erik was crucial for the collection of data concerning the European Court of Human Rights. Erik has also offered thoughtful comments on the articles that make up this dissertation and hosted me during my stay as a visiting researcher at Georgetown University. I have also learned a lot from having Erik as a co-author on a paper that I have worked on as a side-project to this dissertation. I would like thank the Norwegian Research Council for support received through its Centres of Excellence funding scheme (project number 223274). A significant part of the work that has gone into this dissertation has involved data collection, which would not have been possible without the hard work of a small army of research assistants. I would therefore like to thank Dongpeng Xia, Ella Adler, Olja Busbaher, and Gianinna Romero who helped collect data iii concerning the implementation of European Court of Human Rights judgments, and Live Standal Bøyum who helped create the database of Inter-American Court of Human Rights judgments. A number of friends and colleagues have also provided invaluable feedback on the different parts of this project. In particular, I would like to thank Taylor

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Section: Dissenting Opinions and Legal Authoritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Delayed but not derailed: legislative compliance with European Court of Human Rights judgments

Stiansen

2019

The International Journal of Human Rights

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“…Woodruff v. Trapnall (1850) 51 U.S. 190, 216 (Grier, J., dissenting) ("The statutory proceeding is only held a judgment, as a mere legal fiction, and cannot stand in the way of a court of equity."). 35 There is a large legal scholarly literature on the rhetoric and implications of dissenting opinions (e.g., Guinier 2008;Note 2011;Primus 1998;Stack 1996). 36 I departed from MacDonald's list of seven categories (see above, note 24) because certain features of the language used in judicial decisions seemed to call for further specification.…”

Section: The Functions Of "Legal Fiction" In United States Supreme Comentioning

confidence: 99%

Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice

Mar¹,

Twining²

2015

Law and Philosophy Library

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“…The judges serve the institution and have no voice of their own-individual voices are dangerous because they interrupt this unitary vision and undermine judicial clarity. 45 In this posture, separate (dissenting or concurring) opinions are suppressed because dialogue is seen as damaging: they undermine collegiality, independence and the ruling because they suggest that the answer is not 'right'. Such courts tolerate little individuality-they are ivory towers that hand down the law to the distant and deferring masses.…”

Section: Transparency Trust and The Institutional Posture Of Thmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Advocate General: Assisting the CJEU of Article 13 TEU to Secure Trust and Democracy

Solanke¹

2012

Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies

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The Advocate General (AG) has been a permanent feature of the European Union judicial order since 1957. From two Advocates General (AGs) in a Community of six Member States and Court of seven judges, their number has risen to eight in a Union of 27 Member States, three courts and 61 judges. Their task under the Treaty has remained the same, as has their mode of recruitment. The Lisbon Treaty has, however, assigned a new task to the collective judiciary of the Union—under Article 13 TEU, it is to ‘serve’ the citizens of the EU. What does this mean, and in particular what does it mean for the AG—has the task of these non-decision making officers also changed? This chapter suggests that the objective of this new duty is to manufacture trust in the Court of Justice and argues that this requires more transparency at the CJEU and thus a new role for the Advocate General.

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The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court

Cited by 14 publications

References 0 publications

Delayed but not derailed: legislative compliance with European Court of Human Rights judgments

Delayed but not derailed: legislative compliance with European Court of Human Rights judgments

Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice

The Advocate General: Assisting the CJEU of Article 13 TEU to Secure Trust and Democracy

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