The Pragmatics of Empty Names

Abstract

Fred Adams and collaborators advocate a view on which empty-name sentences semantically encode incomplete propositions, but can be used to conversationally implicate descriptive propositions. This account has come under criticism recently from Marga Reimer and Anthony Everett. Reimer correctly observes that their account does not pass a natural test for conversational implicatures, namely, that an explanation of our intuitions in terms of implicature should be such that we upon hearing it recognize it to be roughly correct. Everett argues that the implicature view provides an explanation of only some of our intuitions, and is in fact incompatible with others, especially those concerning the modal profile of sentences containing empty names. I offer a pragmatist treatment of empty names based upon the recognition that the Gricean distinction between what is said and what is implicated is not exhaustive, and argue that such a solution avoids both Everett's and Reimer's criticisms.Fred Adams et ses collaborateurs mettent de l'avant la théorie selon laquelle les phrases comportant des noms propres vides codent sémantiquement les propositions incomplètes mais peuvent être utilisées pour impliquer des propositions descriptives dans le contexte d'une conversation. Marga Reimer et Anthony Everett ont récemment critiqué cette théorie. Reimer note judicieusement que leur théorie ne parvient pas à réussir un test naturel pour les implications conversationnelles, à savoir qu'une explication de nos intuitions concernant l'implication doit être telle que lorsque nous l'entendons elle nous apparaît comme étant correcte dans ses grandes lignes. Everett soutient que la théorie de l'implication ne parvient à expliquer qu'un certain nombre de nos intuitions et est en fait incompatible avec d'autres, notamment celles qui concernent la dimension modale des phrases contenant des noms propres vides. Je met ici de l'avant un traitement pragmatiste des noms propres vides en me basant sur l'idée selon laquelle la distinction Gricéenne entre ce qui est dit et ce qui est impliqué n'est pas exhaustive, et je soutiens que cette solution évite les critiques d'Everett et de Reimer.

Empty Names and Pragmatic Millianism

“…It also seems true that our ordinary utterance practices allow a fair degree of substitution of these descriptions for the names they are associated with. (Wyatt , p. 672) Similar remarks may be found in Taylor (). Hence, the idea of association between names and descriptions and substituting the latter for the former by pragmatic processes is the common core of all versions of PM.…”

“…It also seems true that our ordinary utterance practices allow a fair degree of substitution of these descriptions for the names they are associated with. (Wyatt , p. 672)…”

“…To explain the intuition that (1) is meaningful (or truth evaluable), many Millians, including Adams and Stecker 1994, Adams et al 1997, Taylor 2000, Adams and Dietrich 2004, Wyatt 2007, and Adams and Fuller 2007, have appealed to pragmatics. The idea is that the intuition in question need not be explained by the semantic content of the sentence uttered; rather it may be explained by what is pragmatically imparted by its utterance.…”

Russellians can have a no proposition view of empty names

“…Everett (2013), drawing on Walton (1990); Richard (2000), argues that speakers can use sentences that are without truth value to convey truths about the world. Pragmatic accounts of various sorts are discussed in Adams, Fuller, and Stecker (1993); Adams, Fuller, and Stecker (1997); Adams and Stecker (1994); Taylor (2000); Everett (2003); Adams and Dietrich (2004); Caplan (2006); Adams and Fuller (2007); Wyatt (2007); Piccinini and Scott (2010); Mousavian (2015). Some of these views posit a confusion between semantics and pragmatics to explain the error; such confusions are certainly possible.…”

Pragmatics of No Reference

“…Ryckman (), Fred Adams (e.g. Adams and Stecker, ; Adams et al ., ) Laura Dietrich, Garry Fuller, Robert Stecker, Kenneth Taylor (), Stefano Predelli (), and Nicole Wyatt () to mention some, have defended (M) against the above‐mentioned problems by appeal to pragmatics . Let us call the common core of such views ‘Pragmatic Millianism’ .…”