The preference for belief, issue polarization, and echo chambers

Abstract

Some common explanations of issue polarization and echo chambers rely on social or cognitive mechanisms of exclusion. Accordingly, suggested interventions like “be more open-minded” target these mechanisms: avoid epistemic bubbles and don’t discount contrary information. Contrary to such explanations, we show how a much weaker mechanism—the preference for belief—can produce issue polarization in epistemic communities with little to no mechanisms of exclusion. We present a network model (with an empirically-validated structure) that demonstrates how a dynamic interaction between the preference for belief and common structures of epistemic communities can turn very small unequal distributions of initial beliefs into full-blown polarization. This points to a different class of explanations, one that emphasizes the importance of the initial spread of information. We also show how our model complements extant explanations by including a version of biased assimilation and motivated reasoning—cognitive mechanisms of exclusion. We find that mechanisms of exclusion can exacerbate issue polarization, but may not be the ultimate root of it. Hence, the recommended interventions suggested by extant literature is expected to be limited and the problem of issue polarization to be even more intractable.

Echo Chambers and Friendship

“…6 To me, this highlights the importance of the link between echo chambers and friendship. Baumgaertner and Justwan (2022) do not question why individuals have the tendency to believe what their peers say in epistemic communities. Individuals might have this tendency partly because they entertain friendships in echo chambers which gives them strong reasons to be epistemically partial.…”

“…In the former case, one is intentionally a part of an echo chamber. Whereas, in the latter case, one might be raised in an echo 2 Even though there is a growing number of voices that challenge the received view (see especially Kelly (2008), Singer et al (2019), Baumgaertner and Justwan (2022), Dorst (2022) for a discussion on the social and political processes that lead to polarization), focusing on the individual bad epistemic practices (e.g., epistemic overconfidence) is still a standard story in explaining and tackling polarization (Dorst 2022). Many thanks to the anonymous reviewer for pointing out the relevant literature.…”

“…The friendship aspect of echo chambers stressed in this paper adds to the importance of the social networks in which the beliefs are formed. As the growing number of dissenting voices suggests, greater care needs to be exerted on institutional change (Baumgaertner and Justwan 2022;Levy 2021).…”

Critical thinking and the conditions of democracy

“…The proliferation of news and opinion channels, in television and a host of social media, allow anyone to find commentary tailored to their preferences. This isn't just an accidental "bubble" that happens to people, but often an "echo chamber" resulting from their active choices (Baumgaertner & Justwan, 2022). The result of all this is not just a selective absorption of information; it is a growing skepticism about whether there can ever be a commonly shared basis of fact for adjudicating disagreements.…”

Online Echo Chambers, Online Epistemic Bubbles, and Open-Mindedness

“…Levy (2021) argues that political polarization around Covid-related issues is not the result of echo chambers but rather unreliable higherorder evidence. Baumgaertner and Justwan (2022), on the other hand, explain how the preference for belief can generate political polarization in epistemic environments that are devoid of echo chambers or any mechanisms of information exclusion. I do not take a stance on this controversial topic here.…”