2014
DOI: 10.5430/afr.v3n3p27
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The Presentation Arrangements of Pro Forma Earnings Disclosures: Managerial Incentives and Market Responses

Abstract: This study examines whether the presentation of pro forma earnings disclosures within earnings announcements reflects managerial incentives, as well as the impact of these presentation decisions on equity market pricing of earnings. Using hand-collected data, I measure "presentation" along two dimensions: emphasis of pro forma earnings within the earnings announcement, and the display format of earnings. Consistent with expectations, I document three empirical regularities. First, these presentation decisions … Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…Moreover, a large number of studies focus on whether non‐GAAP exclusions allow a firm to move from a position of missing a strategic earnings target based on GAAP earnings to meeting the target based on non‐GAAP earnings. These studies infer that the motivation for the exclusions is to mislead investors by convincing them that an “artificial” performance measure meets a desired outcome (Bhattacharya et al., ; Black & Christensen, ; Bradshaw et al., ; Brockbank, ; Doyle, Jennings, & Soliman, ; Graham et al., ; Isidro & Marques, ; Lopez, McCoy, Taylor, & Young, ; Marques, ; McVay, ; Wang, )…”
Section: Regulatory Standard Setting and Academic Foundationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Moreover, a large number of studies focus on whether non‐GAAP exclusions allow a firm to move from a position of missing a strategic earnings target based on GAAP earnings to meeting the target based on non‐GAAP earnings. These studies infer that the motivation for the exclusions is to mislead investors by convincing them that an “artificial” performance measure meets a desired outcome (Bhattacharya et al., ; Black & Christensen, ; Bradshaw et al., ; Brockbank, ; Doyle, Jennings, & Soliman, ; Graham et al., ; Isidro & Marques, ; Lopez, McCoy, Taylor, & Young, ; Marques, ; McVay, ; Wang, )…”
Section: Regulatory Standard Setting and Academic Foundationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…G, studies generally find that the quality of non‐GAAP disclosures increased subsequent to Reg. G (Black, Christensen, Kiosse, & Steffen, ; Chen, ; Entwistle et al., ; Heflin & Hsu, ; Kolev et al., ; Wang, ). For example, Kolev et al.…”
Section: Regulatory Standard Setting and Academic Foundationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Combining the findings and evidence of informative and opportunistic motivations for disclosing non-GAAP financial measures, Wang (2014) provides a different explanation for the behaviors of managers and the potential response of the market participants with respect to non-GAAP financial measures. His study shows that the response from the market is varied given how much knowledge the investors have, what the economic conditions are, and what penalties are in place for misreporting.…”
Section: Literature Review and Research Questionsmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…This time frame chosen is of particular interest also because not only does it explain firms' behavior in times of crisis but also the response to Regulation G that was introduced in the US in 2003. My study is related the findings in Wang (2014) as it assesses the quality of Canadian firms' of non-GAAP financial disclosures by comparing the adjustments firms are making to their GAAP information to detailed guidance from regulators.…”
Section: Literature Review and Research Questionsmentioning
confidence: 99%